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ABSTRACT ~· 
Green was a late n~neteenth century English idealist. 
This thesis exainines in an expository and critical fashion 
the central ideas of his~theory of experience. ..... Green 
reacted to the Darwinian threat to naturalize religion and 
morality. He saw the source of this threat in the -Lockean 
foundations of contemporary English philosophers lik~ 
Herbert Spencer. His program consiste~d in two parts. 
First he gave a devastating critique of the entire Lockean 
tradition (Locke, Be;lte.ley, Hume and Mi~l). His central 
. 
. criticism of the Lockean tradition was that they could not 
account for knowledge except in terms of relations or 
universals yet they could never give a satisfactory account 
of the function and origin of relations. Secondly he developed 
a positive theory of lqiowledge and the function an~ origin of 
Ii;'' 
relations. He reconciled science.and religion by showing that 
nature implies a non-natural principle•" Difficulties are 
found in Green's position, ~ne of whi.ch is that he argues .from. 
the ego-centric predicament. 0 I 
.J 
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;ENTRODUCTION 
.. 
_, 
· Born in 1836, the son of a minister, ... Thomas Hill Green . f 
studied a.ntl later. be.came a p-rofessor at Oxford University. 
· He died suddenly and unexpectedly at the age of 46 (1882), 
only five years after taking the chair'of Whyte's Professor 
of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. While at Oxford he was the 
recognized leader of -a·-··new movement in philosophy and enjoyed 
the reputation as a scholar of the highest order. 
,. . 
The· rise of i.dealism had a telling{ impact on the I 
standards of English philosophic scholarship. An essential 
part of the new movement was .. a deepening in scholarship. An 
enormous amount of significant and impressive scholarship 
came from the hands of the idealists between 1865 and 1910. 
. J .• H. Stirling wrote the first serious English commentary on 
.. Hegel in 1865 (The Secret of Hegel). Shortly thereafter</ 
Green wrote his impressive critique on Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume. Jowett w·as translating the complete works of Plato. 
Nettleship wrote ~is lectures on Plato. Edward Caird wrote 
his classic commentaries on Kant and Hegel. To appreciate 
the overwhelming impact of these late nineteen century 
idealists, one has to know something of the philosophic 
situation preceeding their emergence. 
l)..------ . 
William James wrote of the era immediately preceeding 
the rise of English idealism: 
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Tne general impression made was of crude issues and oppositions, of small subtlety 
and of a widely spr_ead ignorance. Amateurish-
ness was rampant··· Samuel Bailey's . 'l.etters 
on the philosophy of the human mind,' published in 1855, are one of the ablest 
. expressions of english associationism, and ~. 
--book of real power. Yet hear how he writes 
of Kant: 'No one, a~ter reading the.extracts, 
.etc., can be surprised to hear of a declaration by men of eminent abilities, that, after years 
of study, they had not succeeded in gathering 
one clear idea from the speculations of Kant. I should have been almost .surpris~d if they had. In or about 1818, Lord Grenville, when 
visiting the La,kes of England, observed to Profe~sor Wilson that, after five years' study 
of Kant's philosophy, he had not gathered from it one clear idea. Wilberforce, about the same 
·time, made the same confession to another friend of my own. 11 I am. endeavoring, " exclaims Sir James Mackintosh, in the irritation, 
evidently, of baffled efforts, "to understand this accursed German ··phil9sophy."' 
• • • • • • • • ' • • • • •.1 • • • • • . . . ·• 
What Oxford thinker would dare to print such 
naif and provincial-sounding citations of . 
authQrity to-4ay?l . 
.. . . 
... , 
' 
....... 
.. , 
-~-.-· 
The answer was clear. What had happened t·o imJ>rove and deepen 
the level of English scholars.hip in the time between Bailey's 
\ nLetters" and·James' lectures "on the Present Situation in I 
Philosophy·?" James answered that "Ferrier, J .H;. Stirling,· and:, 
most of all, T.H. Green are to be. thanked. 112 ' 
Surrounding Green was an aura of reverence._ John Dewey 
described him as "scrupulous to a fault ... in refusing any 
I 
. 
alliance with outside movements or parties that-might make 
1 
lwilliam James, A'Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Greem, and Co.,-1909), pp. 4-5· 
·
2 Ibid., p. 6. 
, ,., 
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' 
f6r- h:i..s 8.d;antage. u3 W. H. Fairb:rother described his "stirling 
n4., honesty as a scholar. No doubt he deserved much of his 
prestige and the admiration of his colleagues. __ Nettleship, 
;. -who wrote Green's "Memoir, " tells us tha·t it ·is "little more 
than a re-cord of his opinions; and I have given it, as far 
• 
·as possible, in his own words. n5 Yet Nettleship paints a 
.. picture not of a man, but of a saint. At times the "Memoir" 
reads like young Plato describing Socrates after the master's 
death. A· great man had left life, a man one could only admire 
and emulate. -u 1We shall ne,ver know a nobler mam· 1 ; · so wIITa,te 
\ 
one of his ~riends on hearing of his death, and with this 
. \, ~ 
simple expression of what many feel we may best take leave 
of him. 116 He had "quiet good judgment" and the "perception 
d ,,rr of the right thing to be one .... 
Of his remarkable gifts of'intellect and 
character I need say but little. His 
strength lay in a rare combination.of 
deliberative, analytic, and systematising 
· poi1er, and of all with force and stead-
fastness ·of character. He was not a mere 
-discoverer of sporadic good ideas; h~s 
tendency was to form his conclusions .Lin to 
a whole, in which nothing waa isolated or 
out of relation to the rest.~ 
3John Dewey, "The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Greep, " The Andover Review, XI (April, 1889), p. 337. 
/ I 
4w.H.Fairbrother, The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green (New York, 1896), p. v. 
5R.L.Nettleship, "Memoir," in Works of Thomas Hill Green, ed. R.L.Nettleship (3 vols. ;2nd ed.; London: Longmans., Green, and Co., 1889)., III, p. vi. 
6Ibid., • p . . Cl.X. 
7 lxii. Ibid., p. 
'\ 
8:Ibid. , 
,, p. lxiii: 
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•1 ~. I. ·' •.... 
Green 1as morally unimpeachable but.yet no prude. 
•• ....:,..4..-
.• 
T~ough he had little of the animal in·him, 
and was never troubled-· by his- appeti ties, he was quite free from prUderyo If 
, 9bsceni ty moved him at all, it. was .to frank·, laughter or to grim contempt; he nev~r dwelt 
-upon it, either in t.~e~way of enjoyment or loathing.9 
--· ----- ~ 
5 
.. 
• 
·, , .. 
-- I 
. t 
Green was extremely popular and had a powerful influence on , · 
his students as well as his colleagues. One gathers from 
. Nettleship tha~ there was never a kinder, nobler, juster, 
-~·· 
• 
greater man that ever walked the earth. 
8 
His wife once told him that he was like Sir 
- ' 
.,, Bers in the Holy Grail, and the likeness· holds in more senses than one. A 'knight 
of the spirit' he assuredly was; not Galahad, 
'crowned king far in the spiritual city'; not 
.Percivale, sadly resolved 'to pass away into the quiet life'; not Lancelot, with 'the fire 
of madnes·s in his eyes'; but 
'S·ir Bers it was Whd- spake so low and sadly at our beard; And mighty reverent at our grace was he; 
. A square-set man and honest; and hi·s eyes,-
. An out-door sign of all the warmth within, Smiled with his lips ---a smile beneath a cloud, But heaven had meant it for a sunny one.' 
And if we had asked him whether he had seen the divine vision, we can fancy that, like Sir Bors he~ould have answered, 
'Ask me noti for I may not speak of it; I saw it.' 0 , 
Theugh not all who wrote about Green sang their praise ~s loud 
.... ~ 
.~ 
as Nettleship, still, in general, Green-' s ·contemporaries thought 
he was a great man: a technically proficient philosopher and a 
moral giant. Perhaps- he was .. 
9rbid., p. xxxii. 
10Ibid~, p. clxi. 
' ' 
·-· 
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. Green wrote and taught. in an intellectual milieu charac-
·terized by empiricism, utilitarianism· and laisser-faire 
. 
__ - ' 
. individual_ism·; ten year.& after his death all of these positions 
' wer~ in disrepute. This rev~rsal is most striking in philosophy· 
..,;{. 
/ 
,. 
whe~e the reigiling philosophy changed from various forms of 
. empiricism to-neo-Hegelianism, of which a former pupil of 
Green's -- F.H. Bradley -- was the leading theorist. Green 
was the major influence in this change in ideas. As,T early as 
1884, James Balfour -- a realist critic of Green -- stated. that 
0 Green "more than any other, has contributed by his writings and· 
personal influence to the spread of the new ideas."11 In 1901, 
I 
the American· philosopher Evand~r Bradley McGil vary said that 
:"among almost all writers of the present day he [Green] is 
I 
q; I 
,,tf ' 
:regarded as the founder in England of a large and active schOQl• 1112. 
Green ~-tr·st gained wide notice as a critic. ,He wrote 
detailed and critical analyses of Lo.ck.e, Berkeley, Hume, Herbert 
Spencer, and George Hen~Lew~s. He also wrote commentaries 
on Mill and ,Kant (lectures that ·we·re not published until afte·r 
his death) but since he essentially agreed with Kant, thoff¢ 
l·ectures ,were less critical in nature. He was then and still 
·i:s highly regarded as a crit·ic with considerable powers. In 
1900 Roger Johnson wrcrte tha·t Green's "work represents the y-
11Arthur James Balfour, ,iGreen' s Metaphysics of Knowledge," 
~ind, IX (January, 1884), p. 74. 
12Evander Bradley McGil vary, "The Eterrial Consciousness," Mind, X (October, 1901), p. 479. 
,, 
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. high-water mark of English philosophical critic.iSm; 1113. In 
. . 
a recent article, John He~an Randall, Jr. referred to Green 
as "the keenest critical mind to appear in Britain since 
nl4 
.--Hume •••• 
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1%oger B.c. Johnson, The Metaphysics of Knowledge ("Princeton Contributions to Philosophy," Vol. I, no.3; Princeton, New Jersey: April, 1906), p. 5. 
' 
l4John Hermann Randall, Jr., "T.H.G!'een: The Development of English Thought From·J.S. Mill To F.H. Bradley," Journal of· the History of Ideas, XXVII, (April-June~ 1966), p. 217 . 
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r. GREEN'S CRITICISM OF. THE LOCKEAN TRADITION 
(i) Green's Motives and Interests. Green focused his 
critical powers on the British empirical tradition. He did 
so because (1) he saw their epistemological doctrine as the 
sou·rce of hoth the reigning utilitarian social philosophy and 
~ 
laisser-faire individualism, and (2) because that epistemology . 
. 
niade, in his opinion, science ( as ·a. form ·of knowledge) impossibl.e 
' 
as well as the moral life absurd.· Green was alarmed by "the 
sc,ientific impulse to natUralise the moral man. rrl5 He· traced 
this . impulse to the Lockean r_nodel wh·ich explained knowledge 
in term.s of impressJ~ons_ striking the tablet of the mind. 
- ',;-
Through the in:fluence of Hume and Mill, this model persisted and 
became (in, d.ifferent forms) the accepted model of conscious11ess. 
La_te nineteenth century p·sy·chologists, arme--cl w·i th the 
.new prestige of Darwin, expla~ned the k.nowle~ge, of nature in 
· terms of nature. 11 ••• ultimatel.y, as our best psychologists 
/IJ 
teach, it [knowlecige l re-s .. ult.s f·rorn tbe prod,uG:t·io:ri- _of feeling 
-~ 
_in ·us by the ·ex_te:rnal w·or,1·4_ aJl.d t-h·e re_gis,t·ration o,f feeling 
i . . . . . '' 16 n experience ...•. ·· Knowiedge .ahd conscious--n·e·ss were 
explained ·in physical terms. A natural account of man became 
possibl·e:. This threatened, in Green's opinion, morality· and 
' 
religion. "Now it is obvious that to a being who is _simply a 
. 15Thomas Hill GI'een, Prolegomena To Ethics, ed. A.~ Bradley (5th ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1924),"'"P·9· · 
l6Thomas Hill Green, "Mr. Spencer On SubjeCt and Object," Works, I, p. 376. 
·~ .. 
. '· 
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·result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their 
. 17 laws is upmeaning." "The elimination of ethics, then, as 
a system of precepts, involves no intrinsic difficulties -
othe .. r than those involved in the admission of a natural 
lo .: 
.. 
-· · 18 
·science that can account for the moralisation of man." It 
should be emphasized that ethics was Green's main concern. 
' The central motive .behind Green's rejection o·f· empiricism as 
it developed from Locke is that he felt it made ethics and 
·· morality absurd. His epistemology was designed to give a 
justification for his ethics. 
In capsule. form, Green's mot·.ive "was to reconcile sc.i:enc-e 
..• ·-
and fa·i th. ul9 He argued that b·oth nature and morality were 
grou;nded ·on: a .. s.piri tual principl_e_;_ ,both man's theoretic and 
moral life: rest.ed on a spiri;tual princip_l_e. There is little 
. . 
.~· .~ ~ -
· doubt in my mind that Green- fe-lt t·his one of the- most pressing 
questions of his day. Late .n.ineteenth cen·tury religion-a.rid 
morality had been shaken to the ·roots by Lyell and especially 
Darwin who published the Origin of Species in 1859. Darw.in 1 .s 
.study implied (or -at ,least was taken by many to imply) that 
man as well a.s ·nature could be explained .in terms of natural 
~ forces. It was no mer .. e coincidence that o.f. all the contemporary 
philosophers Green could have crit.ici.zed, he chose He-rbert 
Spencer and G.H. Lewes -- the outstanding representatives of 
Darwinism. Spencer was in many ways· the -official philosopher . 
17 · Prolegomena, 
lSibid., p. 11. 
• p. 10. 
l9newey, p. 339. 
.. '•, /· 
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of Da~nis~_-_ Green's subtitle to his four -articles on 
Lewes an·d Spencer ·is- -"Their Application Of The Doctrine .of 
· Evolution To Thought." 
(ii) Locke's Model. Lo.eke asked the question of the 
origin of knowledge, of our ideas.· He answered in terms of a 
waxen block model. At birth, ,the mind was said to be li.ke a 
. blank tab-let ( a tabula rasa) . .Our first knowledge was of 
simple ideas caused by the impressions. of simple sensations. 
Complex ict,eas were formed by reflecti ..on on these simple ideas. 
Locke's model described mind as esseI?-tially receptive 
and matter as essentially impressive. Of course, ideas ,of 
· re.fleet ion are impressive, but they can only occur after matter 
has impressed a :rp..ind. The impres.sive: .feature of matter Locke 
called 'quality. ' The quality of a ,s·nowball is its power to 
§produce. in us ideas of white, cold,. round. 
in us as they are in. the snowball. . 
It produces ideas 
""' 
,, 
. The important question, 20 GreE:!n felt, concerned the .status 
of simple ideas as the "original n ( to 4-·se Green's phrase) of " . 
knowledge. Are simple ideas mere feelings or rather qualities: 
of a thing? Locke seems to take former alternative. He wrote·: 
~ 
"as they are sens_ations or perceptions in our understanding, 
I call them ideas; which ideas, if L speak of sometimes as in 
the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those 
qualities in the object which P,roduce them in us .n21 · But if 
20Green, Works, I, "Introduction· to Hume, 11 p •. 1.3--. u·T.his ·question is the -crux of empi~rical psychology." 
·
211ocke, in Gre.en, Works, I; "Introduction to Hume," p.13. 
10 
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11 
simple ideas are mere feelings passively received, Green 
.. thought we would not be able to expiain the. genes·is of knowl- · 
....... 
edge. As we shall see,- Green did not think that knowledge 
could be explained without recourse to relations or universals, 
and thi..s is just what simple·sensations or mere feelings lack~d. 
They a;e simple, Le. relatiorileSs. If Locke had taken simple 
ideas to be qualities of ·things, he would- have endowed "the 
nascent intelligence With the conception of. substance. •.r 22 
According to Locke's account, the idea of substance is a 
I derivative idea, ~a~ 4-a·ea: Qf reflection. But as it turned out, 
·tocke had to make use -of the idea of substance to explain 
- .. 
simple ideas. Dewey: r·e·c:ognized the validity of Green's p._o:~n-t;, •. .. ,. . 
He wrote:. 
The- basis of empiri,cism ·is the reality of some relation, whether with Locke that of substance, " ,or· with g·ume that of succession. But the result of empiricism is that every relation is a mere product of sensation. This contradiction is essential to the· very method of empiricism.23 
Green felt that Locke, while thinking he was givin-g: ·ai1 
:a.ccount of the object of consciousness, rea,lly explained t.he 
physical conditions of conSc~ousness. 24 Locke confused the 
two. This confusi,on,_ Green believed, was not always apparent 
because of Locke's imprecise terminology. 
'.' The idea of sensation, according to Locke, was not 
c·onsti tuted by a motion in or an impression on the outwa.rd 
parts. Green thought he was · correct here:.: It may be that _.----er 
22Ibid. 
( . 
23newey, p. · 342. 
. .9. . .. 
24rbid., p. 19; ;.· 
'· 
.-): 
J 
.,., 
.; 
.. 
.... 
•'~ • • a - • 
' 
( 
so·und waves strike some part of the ear or that light waves 
" hit the eye whenever we hear or see; but we do not hear 
. \ 
sound waves or se~ light waves. 
Locke'·s own statement -(Book III.iv.sec.lo). 
1 The · cause of any sensation, and the sens a-=· ·· 
tion _itself, in all the simple ideas of one 
sense, a~e two ideas; and two ideas so , . 
. different and distant ~ne from another, that 
no two can be more so. 5 · -
'But Locke held that this motion ·which strikes the outward ... 
parts had only to be transmitted to the brain for it to be 
converted into an idea of sensat.ion. What seem ·strange to 
Green, was how this motion _su_ddenly changed from matter to 
thought, · for when the m·oti.on reac-hed the tablet of the m.:ind:, . 
it was an idea. 
Locke presented a physical model. He g_ave a_ :p11y,sical. !\ 
. ' ' 
·the-o·ry stating that matter affected bodily organs. in ·the mo.d.e 
. . 
.o.f actual impact, much like the way an· arrow hits a tar·g.et. 
. ' Green felt that such a model, and any other materialistic 
model, could never- .acco·.unt for consciousness. The Datw'inian 
model advanced by S:pen:cer :and :Lewes was in the sp·i::rit: o.f the 
Lockean model. t:·t- t·oo tried t·o explain consciousnes·:s· ·tn 
terms of the genesis o-f :natural forces. Consciousness, l_ike 
, 
" . 
• 
:pature, was naturalized. Green thought this ·was_ impossib.l~··' 
:'He believed that an e·volutionary account ·of consciousne·s:s. -
~-
was incorrectly re:garding "the relation between consciousnes-s 
and the world as corresponding to that between two bodies., ·of· 
-
25rbid., p. 10. 
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26 A h 11 which one is dnside the other.... s we s a. see, 
Green argued that cert.ain functions of the min~· ( operative 
. 27 in our, most· connnon experience_s) are n irreducible to phenomena. u -
. He maintained that the intelligent experience __ of man. cannot b-e 
~ "--= redueed. ·to or made a function of,· phenomena. A spiritu·al 
principle is necessary in order to account for the po_ssibility 
of knowledge or intelligent experience. 11 ••• if we were·merely 
.g 
phenomena among phenom_ena we could not hav-e· knowledge of a 
world of phenomena .... 1128 
(iii) The Logical Howler of the Lockean Model. Green: 
thought-·that Hume was more like Berkeley than like Lock~, :but· 
. Hume was operating on the Lockean model. What Hume had ac-
.complished (the de·stru.ction of knowledge from Lockean 
premisses) England had· not understood ... England, he contended.:, 
had not even begun to take the initial steps toward meeting 
Hume's -...challenge. 11 ••• we have: 'never: taken what is the first· 
step, though only the first, to. tts sol'ution. 1129 No doubt a. 
( 
:gr.eat part of Green's attract:Lon -t·o Kant must be attributed 
·bo· the fac.t that Kan't did recogni~ze what Hume had done.. Hume 
woke Kant out· of his dogmatic slumber. 
26works, I, "Spencer on ,S_;u.bj·:ect · and Obj:.e .. c.t," P-~ :·3:64.- · 
27Prolegomena, p. 75 
28Ibid., p. 63. see also p·:. 1:4 and Works, I, "Intro·ductiort. t'o Hume, " pr. 164. 
29works, I, "Spence!' on Sq{)ject and Object, 11 :P· · 375. . ) . 
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Locke explained knowledge of the world ul tima t·ely as an 
effect of the world. The tablet of the mind was passively 
·· affected by sen·sations striking it. Hume confined himself 
only to his impressions and ideas. Li~ke Locke, he played the 
·role of impartial obs.erver and looked into his · 30 an mind· 
' ~ 
but all he coulq find were impressions and ideas, feelings and 
their copies, nothing else. Hu~e's ultimate explanation of 
our knowledge (our ideas) was in terms of a succession of· 
feelings. His system started with the proposition that "r~~lity 
is nothing but a succession of feelings .... 11 31 The only 
difference between impressions and ideas was in their force 
and liveliness; there was no essential difference between 
feelings and thoughts; thoughts were simply less lively im-
pressions. Hume's analysis of ·experiepqe :was i:n terms of a 
succession of f.eelings. ~, 
They (Locke and Hume) reduced ( at lea:st .in: the,ir·· of:Cici-al 
:I)rogram) experience of the world to f.eellng. · According to 
Green, such a program was misconceived. "Limit 'our experience' 
to~e succession of our feelings,. and tl)ere is no 'world of 
t,32 Green claimed· that succ'ession of feeling experience. ' : ·. 
could never constitute knowledge 1 ·Nor would there be nature -
_or o~jects (i.e. possible objects of experience) if reality wal 
30works, I, "Introduction to Hume," p. lq2. 
31works, I, "Spencer on _Sub,ject and Object," p_. 381. 
32works, II, "Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant," p. 74. 
' ' 
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nothing but the successi~ of f~elings!33 ~e questi~ to 
ask, . is, "Why did Green think this?" 
' ' We find his answer 1n·a11 of his ·epistemological· writings. 
~-, 
He ... believed the Lockean tradition (Spencer~- Lew~s, Mill, _Hume, 
Berkeley; Locke) was gu·il ty of a logical howler. The howler· 
consisted in assimilating feelings to the consciousness.of 
feeling. They analyzed_knowledge as a phenomenon of conscious-
ness. Again and again Green stated that" ... 'facts of feeling,' 
as perceived, are not feelings as felt .. :. n34·. The Loc}t_ean 
, .. ._,r-~ 
) tradition confused a multitude of feelings·(sensations) with 
a succession of related events. The howler consisted in 
'"' ·"·confusing success ion of feeling with cognition of success i.on, 
changes of consciousne-ss ~ith consciousness of change ..•. "35 
A multitude of feelings, cannot, he claimed, constitute .an 
experience of connected events . 
... a· succession always implies something 
else than the terms of the succession, and that a 'something else' which can simul-
taneously present to itself objects as 
exis.ting not simultaneously but one befor.e: the other.36 
'\. 
33Ibid. " ... nor, if there were nothing ,b.u-t. s:ucrce··:ssi-ve- fe·e·11ngs, would there be a nature at all." 
34works, I, "Spencer on the Independence of Matter," p. 412. Later in this paper I shall make this distinction clearer. We shall show the distinction b~tween feeling-consciousness (C1) and thought or fact-consciousn~ss (c~). Cf. III,vi. 
35 . Ibid., p. 439 p 
., 
36Prolegomena, p. 39:. 
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-~ . . There is a logical difference between a feeling or sheer 
multitude· of feelings and feelings-- related. 
• 
Lpcke, as we have . 
.. 
seen, e·xplained the experience of matter and motion as a product 
or effect of matter and motion. 
'.!-·- Spencer and Lewes wanted to 
.,__ 
give a naturalistic psycho-genesis .. The error consisted in 
supposing one expli.cable in terms of the other. They presupposed 
the feeling of force to be the consciousness pf force, a sucees-
sion of brain. states· to be .the "'cogrti tion of succession. 
Green thought this supposition was invalid for two reasons. 
' ( 1) Co:q.sciot,sness is implied by ·one ( awareness of related "events) 
but not the other. (2) They have radically diff~rent temporal 
characteristics. Feelings-· take place in time, but the consti-
~ution of feelings as a fact, a related event, is non-tempor~l 
~ 
-- it does. not take place in time . ., 
The complete explanation of what we have said in the last 
two paragraphs forms the content of this thesis. Green had a 
a theory of consciousness, a philosophy of mind.. His analysis 
of perception is a· "working out'' of an aspect· of his theory of 
consciousness. Consciousness is ·fundamental to· ··Green. Insofar 
0 as perception is a conscious proces, it, to_b:,, :ts fundamentally 
important. 
We said above that consc-iousness was not implied by feeling. 
A succession of states does not imply self-awareness. The 
' 
I 
16 
Lockean model n~ively as~umed consciousness to be non-problematic. 
Locke distinguished, as we noted, between an impression continued 
to the b1·ain and one that was not; yet, modification of sensi-
bility was consciousness of related events. Green did admit 
what he called 11 feeling. consciousness,." a sort of protocol 
-
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awareness of a here-now feeling, an Ouchl-awareness;~~ut this 
sort of experience -- _he contended -- was not paradigmatic of 
, Jir ....... -= 
.I•). 
intelligent and moral experience, experience of re.lated matters 
of fact. When he says consciousness is not implied by feeling, 
. '· 
he ·means consciousness in this second sense, the complicated 
.. 
awareness of men experi~ncing related events in the world. His 
point was that a series of feelings (a series of Ouch!-type 
awareness or feeling consciousness) does not constitute knowl-
edge or intelligent experience. A plant may be affected by a 
succession of forces. We may be affected in qur ~leep by a 
,s,u-ccession of· force·s:. Brain states may be sticcessively aff~c't$d 
w·hile sleeping. This is true, but is consciousness of the-s,e 
states as related a necessary result? Certainly not. Consci·o.us.-
ness of succession, consciousness of states as successive, 
implies self-awareness. That is, there must be something 
constant (the self) going through changes of successive forces 
·or. states; and this constant element {the self) must be aware 
:of the changes as. changes of some aspect of itself . 
... consciousness not merely implies relations 
between different states: that might be said 
of the line which my pen is writing: it is a 
rec.ogn:t-tion of these different states as 
rel~ted. It not merely consists of changes, 
but is a consciousness of itself as a subject 
of change.37 
Change itself cannot yield a consciousness of itselr.38 Yet 
, 
this is the supposition in ·t:he Lockean model. For there to be 
' 
consciousness of change, resemblance, likeness, diff~rence, 
37rbid., p. 36 
38works, I, "Spencer on the Independence of Matter," p.437 . 
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causality, there must be the equal presence of something to 
the events related. Equal presence to all is necessary for 
consciousness of events as related in any way. 
We said that another difference was tha·t successive 
feelings and fee~in~ successiveness ( consciousness of sue- ' 
cession) had different temporal characteristics. We are 
affected {like plants) successively in time, but the awareness 
. -- . 
of this succes~ion as successive {~he constitution of suc-
18 
cession) is not a temporal event; it is not a temporal phenomenon. 
Awareness or consc.iousness must supervene the temporal occurrences 
{the successive feelings,· the changing phenomena of feelings) to 
experience them as successive, ·to constitute the relation of 
succession.39 The act of constitution (the recognitiOn, the 
awareness of related feelings) is not itself in the relation of 
which it is aware. 
Nature, with all that belongs to it, is a process of change: change on a uniform method, 
no doubt, but change still ... But neither can 
any process of change yield a consciousness 
of itself, which, in order to be a conscious-
ness of the change, must be equally present 
to ,,all st.ages of the change; nor can any 
consciousness of change, since the whole of it must be present at once, be itself a process 
of changeo There may be a change into a.state 
of consciousness of change, and a change out of it, on the part of this man or that; but within 4 the consciousness its~lf there can be no change. O 
39works, II, "The Logic of J.S. Mill," p. 196. Relations "are 
constituted by the act of conceiving, .by the presence of the 
ego to the 'manifold.of sense.' They are not the gradual 
result of experience, for they are the presuppositions of 
experience." 
4oProlegomena, p. 23. se·e also Prolegomena, P. 75. 
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Why- could there not be change within the constituting 
consciousness? Green denied the possibility of this because. 
he realized that it would have led to an infinite regress. 
If change occurred within the consciousness of ·change, then 
\!/· 
. ' ' 
we would have a new relation which would qemand an explanation . .,, 
What constituted it? G\reen would have been forced into an 
\\;.:,,:-
infinite r~gress i~·within~the act of consciousness whereby 
• the relation of succession (ot,any orer relation) was consti-
tu~ed, ... he ad.mi tted a change to take place. Furthermore, 
#~~-· 
;. "!Iii 
consc~iousness could never change ( there could never be change 
within consciousness) because it is not a space-time entity. 
" ... a consciousness, to which events are to appear as changes, 
cannot itself consist in those events. 1141 Only space-time 
enti ties.J co_uld ·change. 'Change, ' like 'causality, ' or any 
other relation, had meaning for Green only in reference to 
sensible phen9mena. Green ·criticized Kant for extending the 
. t · t 42 C 1· . t . t lf ca egories o noumena.· . onsc ousness is no. 1 se a 
constituted entity; it constitut~d entities. If it were an 
entity like phenomenal things, it could not constitute 
re·1ations. We would have to look f$r the ground of conscious-
ness which accounted for its relations. Green wanted to avoid 
the regress entailed by such :a position. "To call such 
knowing conscioasness a phenomenon, in the ordinary meaning 
of a sensible event, is a confusion between it and tbe process 
.41rbid., p. 60. 
421bid., p. 47. 
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of arriving at or losing it."43 
" Green presented another· reason why consciousness cannot 
be in time. It is the notion of equal presence. Between 
two events, there must be equal presence of both to something 
not either. Equal presence would be impossible if conscious-
ness was merely a cerebral modification occasioned by each 
of the events. Green ~rgued for a non-temporal supervention 
over the events. It is enough to mention this here; it will 
be discussed later in our section d.ealing with rela-tions. 
I.. 
Green adnii.tted temporal events. It would be grossly 
inaccurate .to imagine that he denied this. We eat breakfast 1 
before lunch and Green knew Monday was before Tuesday. There 
is a world of temporal (phenomenal) events. He admitted 
that feelings do succeed each other. There is a world of 
becoming. Green's point was that such a world -- nature --
implied or was grounded on something non-phenomenal, some-. 
thing non-temporal, something spiritual. 
The immediate objection to what we have been saying in 
the last few pages is that Green simply did not take into 
account the"fact that consciousness does in fact change. 
Take the mental act (conscious act) of perceiving. Surely 
the acts of perceiving change from moment to moment, day to_ 
day, year to year. Yesterday I saw a theatrical performance; 
.,. 
today I saw nothing -- I slept all day long; tomorrow I' 11 
• 
· see something else. Everytime we blink our eyes or scan an 
area we are aware that changing acts of perception have 
43 Ibid., p. 66. 
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occurred.- They begin and end; ,they can be interrupted and ~'\ 
distracted. These are acts of consciousness and ~-they do 
change. How then can Green say that· consciousness is non-
temporal, non-changing, non-phenomenal? Green· stated the 
ques·tion precisely: i-t seems that 
The very consciousness, which ·holds together 
successive events as equally pre·sent, has 
itself apparently a history in time. It 
seems to vary from moment to moment. It 
apprehends processes of becoming in a manner 
which implies that past stages of the becoming 
are present to it as known facts; yet h! it 
not coming to be what it has not been? · 
:..:.. 
Green admitted that there was a "m~ntal history," but it 
was a history of the "animal organi·sm," not that thinking 
consciousness which is the .ground of things. The animal 
r'V'organism ( feeling consciousness) experi_ences mental events. 
21 
This cannot be denied. The Lockean model was not completely 
wrong. Try, as Locke suggested, to stop the inflow of sensible 
impressions by an· act of the mind. We cannot. We are affected 
and to a great extent such affection is c·ompletely out·side our 
control . 
44 
... this apparent state of the case can only 
be explained by suppo3ing that in the growth 
of our experience, in the process. of our learning to kpow the world, an animal organism,. 
which has its history in time, gradually becomes 
the vehicle of an eternally complete conscious-
ness. What we call our mental history is not a history of this consciousness, which in itself 
can have no history, but a history of the 
process by which the animal organism becomes its vehicleo 'Our consciousness' may mean 
either of two things; either a function of the 
animal organism, which is being made, gradually 
and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal 
Ibid., p. 77. 
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... _consciousness; or that eternal consciousness itself, as making the animal organism its 
vehicle and subject to certain limi ta ti·ons in so _doing, but retaining its essential 
characteristic as independent of time, as the determinant of becoming, which has not 
and does not itself becomeo The conscious-
ness which varies from moment to moment, 
which is in succession~ and of which each 
successive state depends on a series of 
'external and internal' events~ is conscious-
ness in the former senseo It consists in 
what may properly be -called phenomena; in'' 
successive modifications of the animal 
organism, which would not, it is true, be 
what they are if they were not media for the 
realisation of an eternal consciousness, but Which are not this consciousneSSoooit is this latter consciousness, as so far realised in or 
communicated to us through modification of the 
animal organism, that cons ti ttit.es our knowledge, 
with the relations, characteristic of knowledge, into which time does not enter, which are not 45 in becoming but are once for all what they are. 
46 · 
· only one mind but an account of our mind must take 
· account of both the temporal modifications of the organism --
sentient experience -- and the non-temporal dimension "which 
realises or reproduces itself in the individual through that 
1147 process ..... 
The Lockean tradition's model of consciousness was in-
·+ 
adequate. Hume's derivation of the idea of time ·,1ft instruc-
tive. He failed to realise that for feelings to be known as 
successive (to consciously_experience successive feelings) 
;r there "must be in consciousness an agent whi~h distinguishes· 
· 48 its elf from the feelings, uni ting them in their severalty. 11 , 
45Ibid., p. 78. 
46rbid., p. 79. "We have not two minds, but one mind ..•. " 
47Ibid. 
48rbid., P·~: 36. 
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Because of this difference, Green believed it futile to 
explain consciousness of events in terms of the succession 
· 49 of phenomena. Consciousness, if I may use a metaphor, is 
like a blanket of fog covering a field. It hovers over the 
entire field. Consciousness of events cannot be anything 
that is. before or after the events. "It must be equally ·~ 
·· present to all the events of which it is the consciousness.·· 
For this re,.ason an intelligent. experience ... can neither be 
r} 
· constituted by events of which it is the experience, nor be 
a product of them. u50 
--w-.~. vl 
/ Experience ( our knowledge) can neither be a simple 
product of, nor can it be·entirely constituted by, the events 
of which it is· the experience. The Lockean tradition erred 
23 
in thinking they could explicate knowledge in terms of matter 
producing sensations or sensations themselves. Green likened 
this to a physiologist explaining "the vital process by some I 
particular motion of a muscle which it renders possible.n5l ,-~~~~ ..... 
-
, We cannot explain A in terms of B if B cannot be uflderstood 
or is not possible without A. 
'~ 49Ibid., p.75. " ... there is a function of consciousness, as \, exercised in the most rudimentary experience, in the simplest 
.,;,.. 
perception of sensible things or of the appearances of ,,. ,., objects, which is incompatible with the definition of con~ sciousness as a:ny sort of succession of any sort of phenomena." 
50!bid., p. 21. 
51works, I, "Spencer on Subject and Obje,ct." p. 378. 
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The Lockean model erred in assimilating co~itive acts to physical acts. Locke's model was mechanical. It naturalized man in the sense that it made man a phenomenon among other 
phenomena. Green saw-the same process at the bottom of Spencer's 52 · Darwinian approach. Man was treated as another piece of matter, perhaps more complicated, but essentially the same. Green's 
philosophic effort was directed against this conception. He insisted on a radical difference between man and nature.53 Man 
can participate in the eternal consciousness, but man and nature, 
24 
\-
even though radically different, were in harmony because they ·· 
were both grounded on the same spiritual principle. Their relation to the eternal consciousness, as we shall later see, is radically different. This spiritual principle reconciled science and 
'" religion. Man both is and is not a phenomenon of nature. He is .. in that he is a sensible organism -- an animal subject to organic 
' processes; he is not in that he is a self-conscious distinguishing 
subject and a moral agent, a creature able to participate in·the 
consciousness (the spiritual principle) that makes knowledge and 
morality possible. 
52 Ibid., p. 396. See also pp. 381-382. 
·53Prolegomena, p. 63, 65. 
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II. THEORY OF THE REAL 
(i) The Real Under the Lockean Model. Green· observed 
that the empiricists in the Locke, Hume, Mill tradition held 
. that the real was given in feeling. Locke explained our 
experience of simple ideas in terms of "substances that 
operate on us whether we will or no,,,, 11 54 All knowledge, 
_ he thought, was "the result of 'substances operating' on the 
., 
-elank. tablet of the mind. n55 Hume reduced all ideas to 
impressions, all thoughts to feeling,56 Any ideas not 
re,ticible to ·feelings (like God, substance, self) were judged 
void of meaning; they were unreal or vacuous. Mill said that 
we know things/through sensations -- impressions· made by 
external matter. Like Locke, Mill held the antithesis between 
the works of nature and the works of the mind with reality 
'J. 
falling in the former category. Green wrote that for Mill 
0 to be a real thing, must be something with the constitution 
54works, II. "Lectures on K~~t," p. 2, 
55Ibid. 
• 
J 56works, I, "Introduction to Hume," p. 162. "All, then, that Hume could find in his mind, when after Locke's example he 
.'looked into it,' were, according to his own statement, feelings wi~h their copies, dividing themselves into two 
main orders -- those of sensation and those of reflection, 
of which the latter, through results of the former, are not their copies. The question, then, that he had to deal with 
was, to what impressions he could reduce tho"se conceptions 
of relation -- of cause and effect, substance and attribute, 
and identity -- which all knowledge involveso Failing the impressions of sensation he must try those of reflection, 
and failing both he must pronounce such conceptions to be no 
'ideas' at all, but words misunderstood, and leave knowledge to take its chance." 
· 
-
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of which thought has nothing to do.n57 According to Mill, 
"There is an ou.tward something, · of which in itself we know· 
-
. ~ 
-
26 
nothing, which produce·s in us the sensible effects· -- yellow- .. · 
ness, hardness, etc. -- which make up our complex idea of the 
sub
0
stanc~ gold, .. n5B Mill thought that relations, · resemblance \, 
and succession for instance, as well as objects, could be~ 
reduced to feelings o~ what Green will call feeling-conscious-
ness.59 Two later empiricists, Lewes and Spencer, defined the 
real in terms of the source of feeling -- matter or some force 
nto which our consciousness testifies as an effect to its 
•· 
cause. 1160 Although in different-ways, the empirical tradition, 
following the lead of Locke, characterized experience as the 
registration of feeling. The power.and simplicity of the 
Lockean model led them to believe that knowledge or intelligent 
57works, II, "Lectures on Mill," p. 199. 
5Bibid,, p. 198. 
• 
59Ibid., p. 215. "Relations of resemblance and succession,' according to Mill, are states of conscio~sness made up of other states, certain states of consciousness put together. The effort of all idealism of that sort which takes idea as= feeling must be to reduce 'objects' to feelings and compounds of feeling ... Mill instinctively tries to reduce 'objects and attributes' to states of consciousness, and 'relations' to compounds of such. Resemblance according to him - feeling of resemblance, and that not a third feeling over and above the two resembling feelings, but these two ---<' j)ogether. 11 
· 
· 
60works, I, "Mr. Lewes I Account of Experience," p. 499. 
"· 
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experience could be understood and explained in terms of 
sensation or feeling consciousness. Green challenged this 
assumption and the moael on which it was based. 
(ii) The Meaning of the Real. "What is the real·?" was, 
Green felt, a misconceiveq question. The real is obvious.ly 
everything. "The very question, What is the real? .•. is a 
.. misleading one, so far as it implies that there is something 
·61 else from which the real ca,p be distinguished." '!'he question ... 
to ask is "How is it that we are able to decide whether some-
thing is what we take it to be?" How do we decide whether our 
belief about some particular event or object is true? 
Although Green did n6t think we could define the real in 
terms of something unreal, he did hold the distinction between 
appearance and reality, fact and fancy. As we have seen, Locke 
contrasted reality with' the works of the mind. 
No one is more emphatic than Locki·~ in 
opposing what is real to .what we 'make for 
ourselves,' the work of nature to the work 
of the mind. Simple ideas or sensations we 
certainly do not ~make for ourselves.' They 
-!. therefore a~d the matter supposed t9 cause them are, according to Locke, rea1.b2 
What does Green mean by saying something is 'real?' He 
~ 
I 
27 
used an engine-driver example. An engine-driver saw a· red signal. 
when in fact the signal was not red. Green maintained, however, 
61Prolegomena, p. 26, 
_./ 62 rbid., p. 24. See also, :Works, I, "Introduction to Hume," p. 93:, 
"over against the world of knowledge, which is the work of the mind, stands a real world of which we can say nothing but that it is there, that it makes us aware of its presence in every sensation, while our interpretation of what it is, the system of relations which we read into it, is our own invention·." 
• • • .- .. • '· •• , - ••• -, "• .-,~. -· ." j t· .·~1·.~~:;y.,..-...-..... 
, 
.; 
that his disordered vision had a reali~y of its own independently 
~ 
of what we judge to b~-the correct state of aff;irs. The driver 
saw a.signal. "There is as much reality in the one case as in 
the other, but it is not the same reality: i.e.·, it does not 
consist in the same relations. 1163 The driver objectified his 
sensat~ions and claimed that there was a red light; but he made 
a mistake. Although Green held the distinction between appear-
ance and reality, he believed there was reality in appearance. 
j 
Macbeth did see a dagger; the driver did s·ee a red signal; we 
-do dream of dragons. All experiences are real but we must 
assign them .,,their proper status, i.e., their ·aream status, 
illusion-status, substance-status, etc. 
The peculiar reality-status of things and experiences was, 
Green felt, explicable in terms of their relations. Macbeth's 
.\ 
dagger consisted in certain relations which were different from 
those of other daggers. Macbeth's dagger (dm) was seen only 
CJ 
~ 
by one person and it could not be felt by anyone including 
Macbeth. Furthermore, it had no weight and was an exceedingly 
poor weapon, so airy was its subst·ance. Ordinary daggers ( a0 ) 
have properties such that they can be felt, seen by others, 
painted, chipped, lost, hidden, etc. There is a clear difference 
between d0 and dm explicable in terms of their relations. If 
the relations holding for d0 are ascribed to dm., we have erred·. 
"We may take what is really of the one kind [imaginary] to be 
really of the other [not imaginary]. 1164 
63Ibid., p. 17. 
64Ibid., p. 27. 
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The point of this example is to show the inadequacy of 
defining 'reality' or the 'real' in distinction to something 
6 not real. An unreal something is a contradiction. 5 
The very confusion itself, the mistake of 
supposing what is related in one way to be 
related in another, has its own reality. It 
has its history, its place in the development 
of a man's mind, its causes effects; and, as 66 so determined, it is as rea.l as anything else. 
A definition of the real must do justice to all aspects of our 
--~!_perience. It was important for Gr~en to establish this point 
since his own account of reality made thought (Locke's works 
of the mind) necessary for the very possibility of reality. 
Thought was a necessary component of reality. He obviously 
could not remain within the Lockean definition. But as we shall 
see, he did not think that relation to o•r consciousness (our 
thought) made things what they were. " ..• it does not follow 
that the relations, by which a feeling is· determined in our 
consciousness when we present it to ourselves as real, are those· 
by which it is really determined .... 11 67 ¢Italics mine) 
{.iii) The Unalterable Order of Relations. Green believed 
that both science and common sense assumed a single order of 
relations, unchanging and permanent. Universal natural laws 
- - - -
assume such an order, and as the common man believes, relationS" 
hold even when our eyes are closed, when we are asleep, ·and 
after death. This assumption "regulates equally our ~ost 
65Ibid., ' p. 32. 
66rb1d., p • 27. 
67works, I, "Mr. Lewes' Account of 
, 
the 'Social Medium', " p.500. 
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H.e thought that there was a single, unalterable order of 
relations -- objective reality ~~. but only God was in. touch 
. 
. 
with it. That feeble creature, man.,. always falls short of 
experiencing ·reali y in its fullness; man can only get his hands ,.,. 
1 
on appearance. een said that there is always a gap between 
our experience of" t"hings and things as they are. ·"The relations 
by which we judge [events] to be determined are not, or at any 
rate fall short of, those by which it is really determined •... 1169 
"The object which the most practis.ed botanist perceives in his 
,I-' 
·observation of a flower, is by no means adequate to the real 
;_";:' 
nature of the flower."70 Thus we have two realities: that 
reality constituted by imperfect creatures and reality constituted 
by God, .Humans can never reach objective reality -- that reality 
which consists of unalterable rJations. We experience objects I "---- --
but the objects we experience or perceive are only partial. What 
we experience is only a fragment of an object's true nature. 
" 
"71 The object as perceived is a fragment of the real nature .... 
This distinction is based on mental powers, the quality and 
degree of one's intellect. God's knowledge and intellect is in 
a completed state of perfection. Man, however, has much to learn 
and is apt to err, judge falsely and blunder in the quest for 
-
68~rolegomena, p. 29. 
69Ibido, p. 27. 
70Ibid., p. 73. 
7lI.bid. -~~ ~· ... , 
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. . 4, ... f. . 
30 
;·] 
., 
..... 
~ knowledge. Thus Green believed that perception or sensible 
experience bore. a relation to the. extent of. one's knowledge.· 
·-
What we experi·ence "will vary according to the extent of (on_e 's] 
. knowledge .••. 1172 As one's intellect increased in knowledge, as · 
one's mental po.were increased, the closer--he approached reality 
in its fullness, the more he participated in the eternal conscious-
ness. In his lectures on "Logic" he wrote: 
Neither the thing as we at any time conceive it, nor the thing as we feel it, is the thing in the fulness of its reality. I have a con-
ception 9f a flower, and upon the occurrence 
of a sensation~ which I interpret by means of this conception, I judge 'there is a real flower'; but the flower is really much more than the relations which I had previously 
conceived plus the present relation to sense. But this 'more' still lies in relations which 
my mind is in process of appropriating.73 
(iv) Reality and Relations. Green analyzed reality into 
relations or universals. To be real was to be constituted by 
relations. As we have indicated, outside the real there is 
nothing; outside of things constituted by relations there is 
nothing. That relations constituted reality was demonstrated, 
Green felt, by removing all relations from objects in imagination~ 
When that is done, nothing is left.74 
Since Green assumed that relations were constituted by 
-thought, we can see why he concerned himself with Lock~'s 
72 Ibid., p. 68. 
7-:t._ u " 8 · ~works, II, Lectures On Logic, pp.l 9-190. 
74Prolegomena, pp.24,33,34; Works, I, "Introduction to Hume," pp. 185-180; Works, I, "Mr. Lewes' Account of the 'Social Medium'," p. 513; Works, II, "Lectures On Logic," pp.170,i8@,191. 
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distinction between the works of the mind and· works of nature. 
• 
If we opposed the real tc,-the work of the minq and held that 
relations were the work of the mind, then we would be forced 
--
to conclude "that nothing is real of which ~nything can be 
said."75 Locke held the antithesis of th~ real and the work of 
the mind with knowledge constituted by relations, yet he failed 
to recognize this contradiction.76 
75Prolegomena, p. 25. 
76works, I, "Introduction to Hume," pp. 93-94. "We have now pursued the antithesis between reality and the work of the 
mind along all the lines which Locke indicates, and find that it everywhere eludes us. The distinction.9 which only appeared incidentally in the doctrine of substance.9 between 'the being 
and the idea thereof' -- between substance as 'found' and 
substance as that which 1 we accustom ourselves to suppose' --becomes definite and explicit as tha.t between real and nominal 
essenceJ but it does so only that the essen~e, which is merely 
real, may disappear. Whether we suppose it the quality of a 
mere sensation, as such, or of mere body, as such, we find that we are unawares defining it by r~lations which are them-
selves the work of the mind, and that after abstraction of th~se nothing remains to give the antithesis to the work of the mind any meaning. Meanwhile the attitude of thought, when it has·cleared the antithesis of disguise, but has not yet found that each of the opposites derives itself from thought 
as much as the other, is so awkward and cpainful that an instinctive reluctance to make the clearance is not to be 
wondered atOQ eo Now, it is of the essence of the doctrine in question that it ~enies all power of origination to the mind 
except in the way of compounding and abstracting given impressions. Its supposition is, that whatever precedes the 
work of composition and abstraction must be real because the 
mind passively receives it: a supposition which, if the mind 
could originate, would not holdo How,then,does it come to pass that a 2nominal essence,' consisting of definite qualities, is 
constructed by a mind,which originate nothing,out of a 'real' 
matter, which,apart from such construction~has no qualities at 
all? And w·hy, granted the construction, would the ~ind in 
'abstraction' go'through the Penelopean exercise of perpetually 
unweaving the web which it has· just woven?" 
Also: Ibido, po94. "For the real, absolutely void of intelligible qualities, because these are relative to the mind, [Locke] is perpetually substituting a real constituted by such qualities, orily with a complexity .which we cannot exhaust." 
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Green---held that reality was constituted by relations and 
that relations implied thought-or mind-activity as·their ground 
or source. Relations and the real could be reconciled and this 
. ;;;,;. is how knowledge was possible. "The real thing, then, is 
• 
individual because universal ..•. "77 Relations were the universal 
aspect of things. They served to define or individuate one thing 
from another. As "We said.earlier, no two things have (consist 
in) the same relations. Two sets of identical properties describe 
one object twice, not two objects once. An object is individual 
(or individualized) by its universal features, its properties .. 
• 
Man's experiences present him with the real,for the objects 
of our experience -- tables, chairs, and apples -- are real; but 
they may be only real for us. The engine-driver's experience 
was real, but only for him. He did not expe~ience the real 
~ nature of things. Those who saw the light switch correctly were 
participating in the eternal consciousness, but to no more of a 
.. 
degree than the experienced botanist who percei_ves a flower. 
They both reach less than the fullness of being, being as consti-
"' 
' 
tuted by the eternal consciousness. 
imperfect. 
Man's knowledge is necessarily 
It.' I 
(v) Green's Idealism. Green was an idealist, bu~ his was 
not the "false idealism" of Berkeley, Hume,.and Mill. Green 
defended "the idealistn which interprets r·acts as relations, and 
can only understand relations as constituted by a single 
77works, II, Lectures on :C.,og_ic," p. 189. 
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spiritual principle •... 1178 He followed the general "lead" of 
Kant in enquiring what is necessary to c.onstitute, what is 
implied in there being, a world of experience -- an objective 
world .... n79 His analysis of the conditions of intelligent 
experience showed that a spiritual principle was implied by 
nature. His idealism was founded on and it focused its attention 
on the concreteness of things. He discovered that particulars 
require -universals and universals were grounded in consciousness. 
Green ridiculed Spencer's unschoiarly and naive understanding 
of idealism_ . 
... what Mr. Spencer understands by 'idealism' is what a raw undergraduate understands by it. It means to him a doctrine that 'there is no such thing as matter,' or that 'the exteinal world is merely the creation of our own minds' 
-- a doctrine expressly rejected by Kant, and which has had no place since his time in any idealism that knows what it is about. Either Mr. Spencer's profound study of the physical sciences has not left him leisure, or his splendid faculty of generalisation has relieved ~ .him from the necessity, for a_ thor9ugh iAvesti~ gation of this history of philosophy .... ~o 
Green said that the "whole aim" of his ideafism was "to 
articulate coherently the conviction of there being a world of 
abiding realitie~ other than, . . I and determining, the endless flow or our fe1elings . 1181 
78prolegomena, p. 42. 
T9rb1d., 
However, he felt both Locke and Kant 
8oworks, I, "Spencer on Subject and Object," p ..• 386. In his Principles of Psychology, ,Spencer wrote a polemic against idealism. That was the source and motive for Green's remarks here v 
.. 
81Proiegomena, p. 42. 
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• destroyed objectivity. The former made knowledge impossible 
\ 
_by giving relations fiction-status; Kant destroyed objective 
knowledge with his dualism. If we accepted Kant's account, then 
"Man weaves a web of his own al'ld calls it a miverse.n82 Why 
assume just one universe? Why should there not "be any number 
of such independent creations. irB3 Such a claim,. Green contended, 
was incompatible with objectivity. 
In regard to Green's idealism, tt is interesting to note 
that .. he repudiated both the tags of "Hegelianism" and "Transcen-
dental Idealism." Henry Sidgwick. wrote that Green 11 Particularly 
objected to !!!l_ labels for him ... ! called him a 'Transcendentalist' 
and I called him a 'Hegelian': and he objected to both. 1184 
Sidgwick went on to say that he never understood 
.•. why a philosophical system so closely filiated to Kant's should repudiate the master's own designation, 'Transcendental'. But 'Hegelian' is a term that I should never have applied to the author of the Prolegomena to Ethics .... r remember ... in the last philosophical talk I had with him, 
.he said, "I looked into Hegel the other day, and found it a strange Wirrwarr": -- the sentence startled me; and the unexpected German word for 'chaos' or 'muddle'fixed it firmly in my mind.~5 
82Ibid., p. 45. There is no contradiction between Green's own 
·\ 
.. .. 
critic ism of Kant and his criticism of Spencer's understanding ----:"~~ of idealism. Kant ,f'expressly rejected" the notion that the mind makes matter. The mind supplies only the form. The material element comes from the thing-in-itselfe Spencer apparently did not appreciate t~is. Kant's dictum was that the understanding makes the world out of something it does not make. The metaphor of weaving a web refers to the forms supplied by the understanding. 83rbid. 
84H.Sidgwick,"The 
pp.18-19. 
85Ibid., p. 19. 
Philosophy of T.H.Green, 11 Mind X(January,1901), 
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In light of Green's main charge against Kant, viz., that 
he destroyed objectivity· with his duali·sm or with his notion 
; .. 
of the thing-in-itself, it does not at all seem strange to me 
that Green should repudiate being called a "Kantian" or a 
.j 
"Transcendentalist." One could hardly identify oneself with 
a· school and at the same time reject fundamental aepec:ts of 
that school. How could Green call himself a Kantian and yet 
deny that there is any fundamental difference between phenomena 
and noumena, intuition and conception, inner and outer sense? 
(vi) Criterion of the Real. A few pages earlier we posed 
the question of a possible criterion of reality. How do we tell 
if something is really what we take it to be? How do we determine 
whether the relations are related as they appear to be related? 
Green answered that we verify the truth-value of propositions 
by empirical tests. He held the common-sense and scientific 
view that "we do so by testing ·the unalterableness of the 
qualities which we ascribe to it, or which form its apparent 
nature. 1186 The criterion is the unalterableness of relations. 
Green illustrated this with a hill example. On a clear day 
(t1 ) the hill appears near. Qn a cloudy day (t2 ) the hill 
appears far away. Since we were looking at the same hill from. 
the same place, we judge it could not have changed its spatial 
location between t1 and t 2 . The appearance might have changed, 
but certainly not the hill's position. "What it was really, Ii. I 
86Prolegomena, p. 29. 
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it was unalterably. There may have been a change from that 
appearance to another, but not a change of or. in whatever 
was the reality of the appearance. 1187 - There must have been 
other conditions which effec~ed this change of appearance, such 
as the density of the atmosphere. We judge that if the spatial 
position of the hill was the only· relevant condition, then the 
appearances at ti and t 2 would have been the same. 
It might be objected, "How do we know the .. hill is ·the 
same hill?" Again I.think Green's answer would have been that 
we know the hill is the same by empirical tests, by testing 
the various relations of the two. If nei~her the time it 
.. 
takes to walk to the hill (at the same speed) nmr the direction 
in which we walk varies, even though the distance and direction 
subjectively seems to vary, then we have every reason to 
.. 
believe that the hill is the same hill and that it has not 
changed its location. We may perform any number of t.est_s· ·t.o 
determine whether or not it is the same hill. If the properties 
are the same at different times, then the hil:l is the same. 
:ii;. 
;,;_., 
87rbid. 
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III. RELATIONS 
·, (i) The Importance of Relations. The doctrine of 
I 
relations occupied a central position in Green's metaphysica-1 · 
system. In Balfour's opinion "the whole fabric of his 
. ,. · 88 philosophy rests on his theory of relations." 
According to Green, the empirical was real. This is to 
say it consisted in relations, and this meant it was ideal or 
mind-dependent. Relations constituted "the very essence of 
reality. 1189 Without relations things "would not exist at 
a11."90 If Green was correct, intelligence plays a necessary 
role in the real of experience and we must abandon any 
Cartesian-like dualism that suggests a gulf between subject 
and object. Green wanted to break down this tight distinction. 
(ii) Relations as Predicates. 'Relation' was used by 
~reen in a wide sense. Perhaps a helpful way to understand 
his use of 'relation' is to compare it to a propositional 
function. Since Green. thought that " ... all predication is 
founded on relation of some kind. 11 ,91 this comparison ought 
to be helpful. 
In f(a), !. is a property exemplified by.!· In R{a,b), 
1j 
a and b exemplify relation R .. Since to be real is to be 
- -
-
constituted by relations, f(a) could represent something real. 
88 6 Balfour, p. 7 . 
89Prolegomena, p. 25. 
90ibid., p. 33. 
9libid. 
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But what about a in isolation from f? a is completely un-
-
- -
qualified and non-identifiable; nothing could be said of it. 
Green said that to speak of~ in isolation from f(a)· was an 
illegitimate abstraction. No part of our experience comld be 
symbolized by a. Relationless experience was not possible. 
-
Relations for Green· correspond to f and R in the propositional 
- -
11 1 t. It 92 functions. In truth attributes mean re a ions .... 
(iii) External and Internal Relations. The status of 
relations became a lively and exceedingly involved topic of 
debate, as Professor Ewing has shown, between the realists and· 
idealists after Green. The question posed was whether relations 
,,, 
were internal or external. Idealism defended the side of 
internal relations against the realists who supported the 
thesis of external relations. 
The later idealists asked whether a term could be what it 
is apart from all its relations to others. They answered in 
the negative and thought that everything was ultimately 
internally related to everything else, and that if one thing 
was known sufficiently well, everything would be known equally· 
' 
well. These later idealists are represented by Blanshard's 
definition of 'internal' and 'external': ' ft A relation is 
internal to a term when in its absence the term would be 
different; it is external when its addition or withdrawal would 
make no difference to the term .... 93 ,· '_, 
92works, II, "Lectures On Logic, 11 p. 170. 
93Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, (Vol. II, New York:· 1940), p. 451. 
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Green did not direct himself to this debate for the 
~bvious reason that it occurred after his death. However, 
from his writipgs, one might get the mistaken notion that 
_ Green did address him·self to this question since he spoke 
of internal and external relations. His use of 'internal' 
·------ ... · 
' and 'external' , .. as we will make clear, is not in the sense 
these terms took in the later debate. He was talking about -
a different problem. His position was that an object was 
in vol ve,4 in many relations, but it made no sense to call 
-~ 
' 
relations either internal or external. 
\..,_ 
Green held that relations (all relations) were minq-
constituted or mind-dependent. This was for him an epistemo-
logical fact with ontological implications. For Green, 
relations accounted for unity -- the unity of multiplicity. 
Relations were necessary since unity could never be a function 
of the individual manys. Simply being indi.vidual was a form 
of unity. 
He thought that once we understood the .. ,_nature of relations, 
we would see that it would be an absurdity to eall relations 
'exte:rnal' or 'internal.' f' Locke compared questions· about man's 
free will with questions about the speed of sleep or the shape 
I • ' 
of virtue. 
We migh·t employ the· same examples to illustrate 
the impropriety of calling relations, or a 
reality which consists of relations, external. 
One cannot deny that they are external~ any 
more than virtue is square, because the - g4 
assertion that they are so is simply unme.aning. 
94works, I. · "Mr·~ Lewes' Account of the 'Social Medium'," p. 498 . 
......... 
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It follows that we cannot call them internal either. If we 
could, call ..ing them external would not. be "unmeaning'1 but false • 
... 
Why does Green hold this view of relations? He was quite 
explicit on this point. To be external or internal is to be in 
a· relation. ·· But according to Green, relations themselves are 
not in ·relations; they relate. "Of the two factors in a 
relation of externality each is external to the other, but the 
relation is not external to either or to anything else."95 If 
C 
relations were always (or ever) themselves in relations -- if 
they were ever internal or external -- he would have had an 
infinite regress on his hands. I have already shown this in I, 
sect. iii, 
(iv) The Necessity of Relations. Remove all relations 
and nothing would be left. " ... conception= the thought of 
objects under relations, and under relations every object must 
be thought in order to be an individual object at all. ... 11 96 
But what is the source of relation·s? The empirical 
~ . 
0 
tradition tried to account for relations in terms of sensible 
41 
impressions. Hume argued that the idea of succession (a relation) 
is derived from successive impressions. Green rejected this 
answer as clearly inadequate (for it assumed the relation in its 
very account of the relation) and he saw only one alternative 
. 
explanation -- idealism. · Relations could never be explained in 
terms of feelings or sensible impressions because relations 
form the very nature of feelings. He wrote: "To say that I ·reel 
95Ibid. 
96works, II; "Lectures On Logic," p .. 170. 
_,---·---- - ·- . 
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it tells nothing uriles.s I can say what my feeling is. But in 
. order to say this I must have recourse to relations. These 
u97 . form the nature of every feeling •... Subtract the relations 
and feelings lack any sort of identification. They would not 
-be real. "Without relation any simple idea wo~ld be undistin-
guished from other simple ideas, undetermined by its surroundings 
in the cosmos of experience. 1198 
We have a good example here of what I said a few pages back 
· about the ontological implications of Green's theory of relations. 
It is a fa·ct, he thought, that relations are a necessary element 
of an intelligible experience. Thus, being had to have relations. 
Why? Because it could not otherwise be known, i .. e., it would not 
be intelligible, we could not understand it. But from whence do 
we derive the majesterial authority to proclaim that being must 
.be knowable? This certainly is not intuitively obvious. Kant, 
for one, distinguished between two sorts of being or reality --
. phenomena and noumena. Spencer called God the Unknowable. I 
admit that it taxes my imagination to conceive of the possibi_li·ty 
of unknowable being, but that is not the point. Imagine a· 
Martian who could not (due to the stn1:cture of. his mind) experi-
ence three dimensional objects. He could not possibly know 
them. Would it then followthat there were no three dimensional 
.objects? The situation might be more problematic than Green 
assumed. 
·I -· 
·C 
97works, I, "Spencer on Subject and Object," p. 378. 8 . 
9 Prolegom~na, p. 24. 
.,. 
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Green would have replied, no doubt, that reality or the 
' ( ,,! ~ ,: I 
, .real has definite status: it is something specific like a flat 
board, a r·ed sensation, or a ten-penny weight nail. To be 
one thing rather than another is to have characteristics whi.ch 
function to define this something as distinct from the other · 
things in the world; and this demands relations. Thus the real 
implies relations and relations depend on consciousness. But 
what about senstations? They are not generated by the mind. 
Green admitted that sensations, as Locke held, were forced upon 
us whether we "willed them or not. They do not depend in any 
' 
obvious way on our consciousness. "We admit that mere thought 
can no more produce the facts of feeling,· than mere feeling 
can generate thought."99 We are affected and it is beyond our 
powers, short of removing all our affectability, to stop this 
affection. But Green went on to say that although sensations 
were not dependent upon our consciousness, they were dependent 
on consciousness, viz., - the eternal consciousness. 
( v) The Sou.rce of Relations. Green accepted Kant 1 s pure 
concepts of the understanding --.the categories- -- as the 
universal relations. 100 He also accepted Kant's analysis that 
the relations were grounded in consciousness (a transcendental 
ego or transcendental consciousness). one of tne major motives 
for accepting this analysis was the failure of what he thought 
43 
was the only alternative -- the empiricism of the Lockean tradition. 
/. 
. 
99Ib:j_d. , p. 57. 
100 -Works, ·II, "Lectu.r,e.s O.n. Logic," p. 173. , . 
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Its analysis was defective. Another motive was that Green felt 
1 
that the Lockean model (unlike Kant's and his own) was a danger· 
to humanity -- to religion and morals. Green was primarily 
concerned with social problems_. He was a devout Christian, a 
minister's son, with a strong sense of social responsibility 
and deeply concerried over social problems. 
Lock.e, to use Green's terminology, grounded relations in 
what was non-thought, in what was not the work of the mind. 
' Relations were grounded in the independent world. Hume 
grounded them in the phenomenal- world. They were beyond our 
control. Take an 
over three point 
erience const~ttng of three sensations 
time. S:-_l- - tl 
s:_2 --~= ·t2 
S3 - t3 The empiricists 
assumed that experience was atomic in structure and that it 
' . ' 
was explicable in terms of its parts. The experience illustr.at·-.eci. 
above would have been analyzed in tenns of the individual 
,,,,·~. 
components. Green rejected the notion of reductive anftlysis 
from experienee to sensations. We do have s1 - t 1 
S2- - t:2 
·s: 
3 
but we do not experience atomistically. Experience is of unified 
wholes. How can this be? How .can we experience unities (like 
apples and chairs) when, as modern (nineteenth century) science 
J 
explains, we are affected atomisticallY? 
'-~-
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It was this situation that prompted Green to conclude that 
\ 
the empiricists' accoun1Bwere insufficient and to posit something 
else -- a synthetic faculty of consciousness -- to ac.count for 
the unity of our experience. Something was needed to run through 
and hold the sensations together. It was impossi·ble to explicate 
unified experience or knowledge solely ·in terms of sensible 
ex~itations. It was necessary, he felt, to suppose "a conscious-
ness which, retaining the ... former feelings as distinct and 
equally present to itself, correlates them as a change or move-
ment.11101 It was obvious to him that this could not possibly 
be a product of sensations. For something to be related, there 
must be a subject to render the relations possible. There must 
be the equal presence of something to s1 , s2 , s3 for that 
bombardment to be unified experience; and this equal presence, 
Green thought, was what the individual sensations could not 
account for. Constituting-thought is not sentience. 
The consciousness of succession or difference 
as a relation between certain feelings is not 
one made up either wholly or in part of those 
feelings. It must exclude from itself their 
diversity and succession in order to be the 
consciousness of it. It does not supervene 
upon their disappearance, but must be equally· 
present to each of them in order to their 
correlation. It is not determined by them, but 
is the conditi~n of the determination which they 
have for it.10 
Green argued that the unity of an experience could only be 
reconciled with the distinctness of its elements if we accepted 
101works, I, "Mr. Lewes' Account of Experience," p. 452. 
l02Ibid., p. 455. 
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thought as running ·through them all and hol~ing .them together. 
Thought held sensations together without effacing their 
severalty. According to Ralph Barton Perry, this was idealism's 
"newargumerit." They-argued from the synthetic function of 
consciousness. "I.t is contended that consciousness affords the 
only genuine unity, and that since the world requires unity 
it must derive it from. consciousness. nl03 
Since unity was a function of consciousness, objects were 
• 
necessarily (structurally) related to subjects (consciousness). 
" .•. relation to a subject is necessary to make an object. 11104 
To be a..n object, a possible object .. of experience, it was 
necessary that there be relations, and relations depended on 
consciousness. Thus objects depended· on consciousness. It • • • 
our intelligence is a factor in the real of experience. 11105 
(vffi) Our Idea of Time. Hume's attempt to reduce our 
idea of time to feeling is a good example of the sort of 
analysis which Green thought was misconceived. The empirical 
tradition often identified relations with feelings. Hume again 
provided Green with a paradigm case. Causation.or the,idea of 
necessary connection was, according to Hume's analysis, ulti-
mately reducible to and identifiable with a feeling. As Green 
observed, Hume reduced the idea of necessary connection to 
"'a tendency of the soul, analogous to desire and aversion, hope 
and fear, derived from impressions of sense but not copied 
.. 
lO~alph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies {New York; 1925), p. 156. 
104 .. 
4 Prolegomena, p. 1 . · 
l05Ibid., p. 34. 
.. 
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Green objected to the method of the Lockean program of which 
Hume's reduction was an instance. Green objected to the method 
-
of a ''disinterested observer looking into h~s mind and accounting 
for the ideas he finds in terms of sensible excitations. Green 
arg~ed that a series cannot produce consciousness of it as a 
related series. because "in ·order to be a consciousness of change,, 
. [consciousness] must be equall.y present to all stages of the 
107 
·change." To illustrate this with a diagram: 
a, · b 
c· 1 
C 
·-2 
= · sens·ible events, feelings; 
= feeling c·onsciousness, conscioua~ess of the 
modifications of sensibility;lO~ 
= self-consciousness of; thought 11as C£8§cious-· 
ness of determination by relations." '::J . 
= related as successive. 
a • • • • • • • • .• :p: 
. •· 
• • 
• •• 
·- . • • ~ . 
• • 
•• • 
• • 
• • 
• C 
. 1. . . .. 
• •• 
R e: 
·c- .·· 
··.n . 
. . i-c..· 
106works, I, "Introduction to Hume," p. 243, 
107 . · Prolegomena, p. 23. 
lOBibid,, p.78. "The consciousness which varies from moment to 
moment, which is in succession, and of which each successive 
state depends on a series of 'external and internal' events, 
47----
is consciousness in the former sense. It consists in what may properly be called phenomena; in successive modific~tions of the animal organism, which would not, it is true, be what they are i.f they were not media for the realisation of an eternal con-
·sciousness, but if.Thi ch are not this consciousness." 
109works, II,"Lectures On Logic,"p.171. See also Prolegomena,p.63,78. 
? 
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To be conscious of b following·a, one must be conscious of 
a and b in the relation of following ( c2 ). Consci'ousness of each 
individually (c1 ) is not pUfficient, for changes of consciousness "-
110 do not_give us consciousness··or change. There must be con-
~ciousness of both at once (c2 ). Equal presence to hath and 
eac~ is necessary._ The Lockean tradition assumed that c1 --
awareness of modifications of sensibility, feeling consciousness 
., 
-- was adequate to explain our knowledge of succession, our idea 
of time. But_ __ there is a radical difference between c1 and c2 . 
Green said that c2 was necessarily out of time, a-temporal; it 
is simultaneously present to each event and each event is a 
temporal occurrence; it shoots through and holds them together 
'in their peculiar relation. In our illust~ation, a and b, as 
well as the c1 •s, are events in time. c2 is the awareness (the 
constitution) of them in a temporal context. c2 is awareness 
of time and the awareness of time cannot itself be temporal, a 
temporal event. The terms of c2 (c1 1s) do not succeed one 
th Th t .f C . . t 1 lll G t ano er. ey canno 1 2_ is. non- empora . reen wro e: 
llOibid.,pp.171-172. "Of two successive feelings, one over before 
48 
·the next begins,neither can be consciousness of time as a relation between the two. Every animal has experiences in time, and animals that see have experiences in space in the sense that there are pictures on the retina of their eyes of which to us the parts are external to each other. But it is quite anothe.r thing to be conscious of relations of space and timeo This they are not unless, in virtue of other than a feeling conscious-ness, they can hold together (a) successive feelings so as to be conscious of them as related in the way of succession, and ( b) success·.i ve acts of vision in which a surface is traversed 
- so as to rep,ard them as. coexisting and mutually limiting parts of a whole.' 
. See also \Alorks, I, "Spencer on the Independence ,of Matter, 11 p.439. Green makes it clear that changes of corJs-ciousness do not imply consciousness of change. ,-
. 
/ 111Prolegome!l.a, p. 41: "A feeling can only/l5e/ felt as suCcessive to another feeling, b,ut the terms --o/f//a rel~tion, as we have seen, even though the relation be one ~-f---succession, do not succeed one another." 
./ 
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;,:; 
• 
~c 
We must observe that to be in time and to be 
conscious of time are different and mutually 
exclusive things. It may be asked, How can 
this be? When I think of time, is(not the 
thought an act of consciousness -- an event --
which take place in time? No doubt an act of 
consciousness is an event in the individual history which is in time, which begins and -
ends, succeeds another, and is over before yet another begins; but it would not be a 
thought of time but for its determination by 
a subject which holds past and present 
together, which is no more now than it was 
then or will be to-morrow, and this is not in time .112 
< -;·. 
In regard to Green's analysis, it may seem strange that 
\tfe cannot give a temporal description of a person cons ti tu ting 
--time. We cannot date this consciousness of time (predicate 
'before' or 'after' to it) since temporal descriptions assume 
the act itself to have relations, something which Green 
eonsistently and expressly denied. The constitution of time 
is· not an event or an occurrence. Green argued that we become 
aware of (we constitut·e) time by -synthesizing sensations in 
the relation of su:ccession. This synthetic act could not be 
temporal unless it too were synthesized, i.e., thought. All 
' 
thought (c2 ) is eternal. Furthermore, only space-time entities 
can be said to change. 'Change' -- and all predicates, 
• 
including temporal ones -- have no meaning if applied to,any-
thing other than space-time (phenomenal) data. 113 Reflective 
'112 
... Works, II, "Lectures on Logic," p. 170. 
~-· 
ll3Prolegomena, p. 47. " ... as Kant himself on occasion wduld be ready to remind us, we have no warrant for extending beyond the world of experienc·e, or for considering as independent of the intellectual principle of unity which 
· ·is the condition of there being such a 1r1orld. ca.usation has no meaning except as an una.l terable connexion between 
changes in the world of our experience ... " 
!i· 1 
:'." .,. 
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consciousness (c2 ) was not itself, Green fe:lt,. a constituted 
entity; rather it constituted entities. 114 
The seeming paradox is. that Gr~en said that tinie was 
" 
constituted, yet we cannot give this a temporal description. 
We, at least I, feel uneasy in saying that we do-something 
between birth and death yet we do not do this something in time. 
How can we do s·omething and not do it in time? 
50 
Tne paradox dissolves if we remember that Q-I!een distinguished-
two ~des-of one mind -- the mode ~f consciousness (c2 } that 
-~ . 
reproduces God and ·the mode of the animal organism (c1 ). An 
.... 
organism is born and dies, but not the eternal consciousness in 
. 
which we may _participate or which we may reproduce. In the 
diagram on page ~7, a and bas well as c1 were temporal moments 
in the life of the animal organism. Our feeling awareness of 
a and bis an act of consciousness which is in time. In this 
sense an animal may be said to be aware of certain things. An 
animal is aware in terms of feeling consciousness. But c2 --
the thought that holds a and b together -- is not in time. 
·Green made this clear in the Prolegomena: 
Our experience, we have seen, has two 
characteristics, of which neither admits 
of being reduced to or explained by the 
other. On the one hand it is an order of 
events in time, consisting in modifications 
of our sensibility. On the other hand it is 
a consciousness of those events -- a conscious-
ness of them as a related series~ ... But, as 
114 
. · Works, II, "Lectures On_Logic," p. 171. "Thought, then,. as 
consciousness of determination by relations,. is necessary 
.. 
to constitute the object of intuition." Thought-consciousness 
is. the necessary condition without which there would be no 
world of experience. 
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has been further pointed out, a consciousness 
of related events, as related, cannot consist 
in those events. The modifications ·or our 
sensibility cannot, as'successive events; make 
up our consciou.sness of them. vJi thin the 
consciousness that they are -related in_ the way -
of before a.nd afte-r there is no before and 
aftero There is no such relation between 
components of the consciousness as there is 
-between th~ events of which it is the 
consciousness.115 · 
The .paradox only arises if we think of man as just the animal 
f 
,, 
organism. Man is also the vehicl~ of a non-natural principle, 
a principle w't1ich makes time possible. c2 constitutes tiine·. 
c2 or thought-consciousness is the vehicle of God working ~ 
in us. " ..• in the process of our J_earning to know the world, 
...,._;..-
an animal organism, which has its history in time, gradually 
becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness. 11116 
Without thought-consciousness time would not be possible.·"' 
"There could be no such thing as time if there were not a"' 0self-
consciousness which is not in time. 11117 We could reword this 
to say that we achieve time-consciousness through God (through 
our participation in the non-natural principle which is implied 
by the world). Randall's observation, if not helpful is at 
least interesting and provocative: 
\.__ In other words -- traditional in character --
Green is a Platonist and an Augustinian: for 
him the human mind in knowing establishes 
relations with the Eternal Mind. Green is 
offering a Victorian version of the Augustinian8 theory of knowledge as a Divine Illumination.11 
115Prolegomena, p. 63. 
116Ibi[. , P• 77 • 
I_:: 
. . 
117Ibid., P• 57. 
118Randall, p. 244 .. 
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, ( vii) The Eternal Consciousness. Green tho.ught that 
the notion of objects independent of consciousness was 
absolute nonsense. It was simply unintelligible, he thought, 
to suppose obje.cts or nature exis-ting except qin relation to 
"' 
consciousness. Subject and· object were strictly correlative. 
" ... :relation to a subject is necessary to make an object. 11119 
A·ccording to Green, natural science assumed a single; 
unalterable order of relations. " ... that there is an un-
alterable order of relations, if we could only find it out, 
is the presupposition of all our enquiry into the real nature 
Of nl20 appearances .... But once granted that relations ) 
depend on thought, how was this supposition possible? If I rt 
nature and objects were reducible to relations which depended 
on consciousness, then did nature pop in and out of existence 
as people died and began to understand? How could this be 
52. 
when objects presumably existed before we .. ·were born and will 
continue to exist after we die'? Green felt that the supposition 
that nature·must come in and out of existence was valid only if 
given an assumption which he refused to grant. Objects do not 
come and go as ~.~ begin to think or die "uriless it is necessary 
to suppose that intelligence first comes into existence when 
this person or that begins to understand ... ~ "12-·1 This 
ll9Prolegomena, p. 15. 
120Ibid., p. 31. 
121Ibid., p. 40. 
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"' Green held the distinction between appearance and reality. 
He warned us not to imagine" •.. that all the distinctions and 
-~elations, which we present to ourselves ..• in the process 'of 
' 
learning to know, have counterparts in the real world .•. _the 
distinctions presented may exist onl~ for us •... 11123 The 
perception of A is no guarantee for the true reality of A. 
·A (the reality as we take it to be) may differ from what 
really is the case. Consciousness is the ground of reality, 
~but relation to our consciousness is not a sufficient condition 
to establish the real as it is. That is, appearance is 
compatible with relation to our consciousness. 
... the difference betw~en the real as it is and the real as we take it to be is not 
a difference between what is in consciousness 
and what is not so- (sic) The relations which form the real fact are relations for a 
consciousness, but for one which is4only partially and interruptedly ours.12 
This is the notion of the ~ternal consciousness. 
Green based his notion of the eternal consciousness on 
two arguments. The first one had two separate parts .. (a) He 
,accepted the common-sense and scientific attitude of a world 
of enduring realities. 
122works, II, "Lectures on Kant," p. 74. "The condition of there being for .us such a~world is the existence of a reasox;i, which we call ours, but which we cannot suppose, without hopeless contradiction and confusion, to have begun with , our sentient life, any more than we can suppose the principl·e in virtue of which we say 'we' or 'ours' to have begun with that life." 
123Prolegom~a, p. 49. 
· 
124works, I, "Mr. Lewes' Account of the 'Social Medium', 11 p.500. 
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But we cannot suppose that those relations of facts or objects in consciousness, which 
constitute any piece of knowledge of which a 
.man becomes master, .first come into being when he attains that knowledge; that they pass through 
the process by· 1r1hich he laboriously · 1earns, . or 
---_gr~dually cease to be as he forgets or · becomes . 
confused.125 
Green was a .. hard-nose realist in this respect. Who could 
"' possibly believe that the objective world depended on man for 
its exist·ence? Things exist for us to know. They existed 
before we were born and they will (presumably) exist after we 
die: (b) This belief in enduring reality existing independently 
of us was coupled with his theory of the real and relations. 
The real consisted of relations and relations were grounded in 
consciousness. For objects to exist, there must be conscious-
ness. These two parts joined together to form his first 
argument for the eternal consciousness. The etern~l conscious-
ness is the consciousness which eternally sustains things. 
His second argument was founded on his analysis of the 
necessary conditions of knowledge. We have already had 
occasion to elaborate this. He began with the fact that we 
y 
• are temporal creatures with knowledge of related events. This 
, 
was a not-to-be-denied fact .. He then asked for the conditions 
of the possibility of such.experience. How is it possible for 
I 
u-s to experience temporal events? How is it possible to have 
an idea of time or experience changing sensible events? 
identical events? different events? Accordingtt)his analysis, 
such experiences. wo·uld not be pos.sible were it not for "some-
125Prolegomena, p. 80. 
::.:, 
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; · thing else" ·outside of· space and time, outside the worid of l, 
becoming.· . Knowledge of events in time was not possible 
except on the supposition of s.omething outside time. 
--
Int ell igen t experience demanded a synthetic principle as the 
source of the relations which give unity to diversity. Knowl-
edge of related facts entailed a non-natural (spiritual) 
55 
, principle which could only exist outside of time. This principle 
was the eternal consciousness. Our own a-temporal consciousness 
(c2 ) becomes united with the eternal consciousness. When man 
thinks or is consciousness in the sense-of c2, he "shares the 
, 
· · - 126 eternal consciousness." This. is to say that "t.he eternal 
consciousness reproduces itself in our knowledge. 11127 Man is 
.. 
united. with God. God is "in" man; man has the divine "in" him. 
This union of the eternal with the finite makes both nature 
and morality possible. 
It would be reasonable \o ask Green about the nature of 
this eternal consciousness. He called the eternal conscious-
ness 'God'. Is God a person or more like a divine force 
analogous to a physical force like gravity? To such question 
as these, however, we shall get no answer. We know that God 
functions to make nature and morality possible, but "As to what 
·~· that consciousness in itself or in its completenes·s is, we can 
only make negative statements. 11128 Green did use 'He' in 
126 Works, II, "Lectures on Kant·," ·P· 75. 
127Prolegomena, p. 83. 
128Ibid., p. 58, 
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reference to the eternal consciou~ness, rather than ~It', but 
it would be sheer speculation to conclude anything from that. 
- We can say that .. the eterna-1 consciousness is spiritual, 
outside space and time, immaterial, immovable and "eternally 
.... ,- . ' ) 
6~e with itself."129 ' But these are just negative stateme-nts 
56 
to the effect that He is not like us., This might be of some 
consolation to lingering Scholastics. Even though the nature 
of God is not clear, this does not effect his argument. His 
argumen_t was only that nature and knowledge implied a spiritual 
principle. And this spiritual principle he calls God. 
Green did not think his notion of God· gave him a dualism. 
He claimed he was talking about one mind with different aspects, 
just as one shield may have two sides. "We have not two minds, 
but one mind. nl30 In his lectures on Kant he even went so far 
as . to say "our reason ••. is this eternal· consciousness. nl3l 
Our minds, he said, "may mean either of two things; either a 
function of the an-imal organism, which is being made, gradually 
and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness; 
or that eternal consciousness itself .... "132 Consciousness 
has two aspects: we tried to show this by distinguishing c1 
from c2 • He called this a "twofold conception of the mirld. 11133 
129Ibid., p. 62. 
l30ibid., p. 79. 
:;; 131works, II, "Lectures 
l32Prolegomena, p. 78. 
l33Ibid., p. 80. 
I 
on Kant," p. 1-4 .. 
. .... 
' Against Green's remonstrations, there is a dualism which 
he was only able to camouflage by speaking of two aspects of 
·--
one mind. Greep -distinguished between appearance and reality. 
He said that re·lation to our ·consciousness was not a sufficient 
guarantee of the "real naturet' of the ,thing. The real thing . 
exists for the eternal consciousness. But if the eternal 
consciousness was our consciousness, if c2was the eternal 
consciousness, he could not say this. The engine-driver did 
see a signal, but he erred. The botanist, when he perceives 
,, (is_ consciously aware of) a fl_ower, only grasps. a "fragment 
of the real nature." Green insisted that re·lation to our 
consciousness was not sufficient guarantee of the "real nature" 
of things; but relation to the eternal consci~~ was. As 
he wrote, 
That real nature, indeed, if our previous 
conclusions have been true, must consist in relations of which consciousness is the 
medium or sustainer, though4not consciousness as it is in the botanist.I3 
-The eternal consciousness is not exhausted by man, although man 
~ 
. 
participates in it. It is something over and beyond man. It 
is able to sustatn and guarantee an eternal univer~e. Man's ; 
reason is not the eternal sustainer,_ for even the_ -di vine 
element in man -- the spiritual principle_-- needs an animal 
organism in order for knowledge to be realized. The eternal 
consciousness has no such limitation. It realizes itself or 
reproduces itself in us when we know. 
l34Ibid,, p. 73, 
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Green only confused the situation by denying a dualism, 
-for a dualism···he has, even if he wanted to avoid one. We do 
-. 
-not have two minds, but there are two different sorts of-minds 
in the universe. · One is incomplete, striving to realize it-
self, trying to know and falling into-error; the other is 
complete, eternal and reproduces itself in us. Green could 
-have avoided this dualism by making everything a mode or mani-
·restation of the One. He was too ·realistic -- too Lockean --
and not enough Hegelian to take this final step. 
With the notion of the eternal consciousness, Green 
~ thought he had shown that stience and r·elig;_ion (or morality) 
rested on a spiritual principle. The eternal consciousness· 
" 
was God and God made both religion and science possible. 
The possibility of participating: in this spiritual principle 
made the moral life possible. It should be remembered that 
Green's epistemology was designed to serve his social thought. 
He thought the question of man's relation to nature necessary 
groundwork "before we can be sure ~hat any theory of ethics, 
. 
'". . 
' 
-~-
in the distinctive sense of the term, is other than wasted 
labour. 11135 Ethics needed jl.lstifiCation if it was to be more 
. ' , ... 
' • .J 
than poetry, and justification involved Green in epistemology. 
According to Sidgwick, the eternal consciousness was 
"essential to his ·ethics.n136 The good of man -- his moral 
135 Ibid., p. 58. 
,. 
136sidgwick, p. 23. Green admitted this in his lectures on Kant. Works, II, "Lectures on Kant,rr p. 74 (footnote 1): "It [the 
eternal consciousn.ess] renders morality possible too." 
. ' 
... l. 
... 
i 
·1 
.. 
iq.eal -- is formed by the eternal consciousness reproduci.ng 
itself in the human soul. 
'1. 
Man can know this ideal; "the 
essence·of man's spiritual endowment is the consciousness of 
, 
. 137 \ having it .... " and man's moral goodness .-or badness 
-----
... i~ propcirtionate to his habitual 
responsiveness to the idea of there. 
being such a true good, in the various 
forms of recognized duty and beneficient 
work in which that fdsa has so far taken 
shape among men .... 3 
-~-
:--.· 
l37Prole~omena, p. 206, 
l3Sibid,, p. 207, • 
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IV. PERCEPl'ION 
{1) The Status of Sensations.~ Green's theory of percepti9n 
is· closely related to his theory of relations. His statements 
i 
on perception- are best viewed as a.n instance ---of the working out 
of his general theory of consciousness. To perceive is always 
to-be conscious of a relation or relations. Perception is 
consciousness of definite objects involving both sensations 
and thought. Remove the former and we have conception (not 
perception); remove the latter and we have unrelated feelings,· 
i.e., nothing. The Lockean tradition failed to recognize the 
essential function of thought_ in perception and identified 
perception with a condition of perception, viz., feeling. 
They defined perception as modification of sensibility. Green 
, 
thought that although sensations were necessary 'for perception 
(" ..• no object can be per.ceived without sensation .... 11139), 
still perception did not u contain" nor w.a·s it to be identified 
with, sensation. 
Locke defined the object of perception as ·the" exciting 
(external) cause of the sensation. Green objected to this. 
He did not think we perceived the exciting cause or stimulant 
of a sensation involved, in perception. Following the science 
of his day, Green believed the stimulant of- sensations to be 
vibrations of ether striking the retina. "That vibration, 
l39works, I, "Spencer on the Independence of Matter, 11 p. 411. 
See also Prolegomena, pp. 68,71. 
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however~- the extern~l ~:x;citing cause of· the sensation ~-is 
not the object perceived in the perception of the colour. 11140 
He believed that.the objects of perceptiqn were nqt the same , I , , 
' . 
·-
for everyone. What peoples~ varies according to their 
· · knowledge-- and attention. No human perception is complete or 
full or adequate to the thing as it is. What we perce·ive is 
· only a fragment ·of the real nature of things. We are aware of 
facts in perception, not vibrations of ether or light waves or 
whatever else science may tell us strikes the eye when we 
perceive. Thfl,t which we cannot reduce to exciting causes and 
"yet is the essential thi,ng in perception, 11141 is the conscious-
ness of objects. Feelings accompany perception ''but they never 
constitute it. 11142 
·a.H. Lewes likened perception to biological assimilation. 
In perception, Lewes held, the object was transferred from 
without to within consciousness. External mechanical elements 
and motions act on organisms becoming neural tremors and thus 
sensations. But, as Green pointed out, 
When he speaks of himself as perceiving a 
coloured or fragrant object, he does not 
mean by the object the molecular motions, 
which through reactions of the organism become sensations of colour and smell, any 
more than by 4, himself' he means the reacting ··~ 
· 1 3 organism .... 
,6' 
140 , 
. Prolegomena, p. 68 .. 
141works, I, "Mr. Lewes' Account of the 'Social Medium'," p. 510. 
142Ibid. 
143Ibid., P• 505. 
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Perceived objects are particular space-time things or events 
exemplifying sens~ble qualities; and this is not the same as 
· molecular motion or a number of moving molecules. 
Herbert Spencer's analysis of perception was vitiated by 
his failure to distinguish between sentience and consciousness 
-- c1 and c2 . He uncritically assimilated the two. He thought 
sen~y,tions were vivid states of consciousness. To quote him from 
Green: 
In broad procession .... the vivid states ... 
sounds from the breakers, the wind, the 
vehicles behind me, changing patches or 
color from the wav~s, pressures, odours, 
. and the rest -- move on abreast, '. ll..ftceasing 
and unbroken, wholly without rer~4d to any-
thing else in my consciousness. 
·spencer spoke of sensations like the smell of sea-weed, the sound 
of breakers, changing patches of color, etc. without realizing 
that a changing patch of color, for instance, implies unity of 
consciousness, a synthetic principle. Green thought this is 
where Spencer went wrong. For something to be seen as changing,· 
it must be seen as blue (t1 ) ,. then as yellow (t2 ), and both (the 
change from blue to yellow) must be held in unity in a single, 
a-temperal act. 
Why was it that so many failed to see the essential differ-
ence between feeling consciousness and thought consciousness or 
between feeling and perception? We have already mentioned one 
reason, ·the power of the Lockean model. -Green attributed another 
reason to the ambiguity of mental terms. Those philosophers in 
144works, I, "Spencer on Subject and Object, 11 p. 405. 
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·the Lockean tradi·tion believed sensation and perception were 
identical or at least essentially the same sort of activity ···· 
-
because the·only words available to describe feeling were those 
~ 
. 
of perception, "and under the illusion caused by this·. usage, 
we are brought to think that the visual and tactual sensations 
are equivalent to the pe-rceptions which we_E~l by the same 
145 names." We know from our experience that affection does not 
imply perception. We may be affected while asleep, but certainly 
we do not perceive while in any unconscious state. We often 
~ , have sensations without perceiving. 
When a man sits in a fit of abstraction with 
his eyes fixed en the window, he sees nothing, 
though there is the same image on the re~ina 
as there is when he is aware of the lamp-post 
in front of it. As we common146say, the image is there but not attended to.l 
Strictly speaking, there is not even an image, in the sense ·t-ha-t 
an image bears a resemblance to objects. Acts of attention --
., ... 
63 
mind activity -- are needed for there to be an object of perception, 
·, i.e., something of which we can be conscious. Sensations are 
interpreted by the mind. A person in a tit of abstraction does ~ 
not interpret sensations as representing anything_; 11 ••• there is 
no perception without an intellectual interpretation of 
sensation. 11147 
145works, I, "Spencer on the Independence of Matter," p. 4:l}t. 
146Ibid. 
147works, II, ''Lectures On Logic,11 P• 176. 
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Green distinguished between two sorts· of experience. - · 
'Experience' can niean affection or it can 1nean recognition of 
facts. Affection (experience1 ) is expertence in the sense that 
., . 
"a plant might be said to experience a succession of a~mospheric 
h i l h n 148 R . t . ( . ) . ) n . • or c em. ca c anges. ecogn1 ion experience2 1.s experi-
149 ence.of matters of fact recognized as such." It was Green's 
opinion that the fo·rmer could never suffice to explain the 
latter ('knowledge or experience2 )-,_ for knowledge is of facts 
consisting of relations. To know something as rela-i-ed 
... we must be able to hold them together; we must discern them on comparison as distinct and different; and this power of comparison is possible only by seeing things together and simultaneously before the mind. In other words, the mind must be present at once to all the elements distinguished and compared~l50 
· 
Our experience appropriate to knowledge is.that by which 
we ·recognize definite facts, e.g. tables and chairs and colors. 
They are facts, states of affairs. Certainly_ there are feelings 
' in the first sense of experience. Mice jump when given an 
electric shock. Green did not deny that there are affectations; 
t·-
148 
_Prolegomena, p. 20. 
149Ib,id. 
l50Percival Chubb, "The Significance of Thomas Hill Green's Philosophical and Religious Teaching," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, XXII (January, 1888), p. lo. 
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it is truev, "in a great part of our lives we feel without 
· thinking. rrl5l But when we do feel without thinking, such 
f-eelings are not facts for us. They a!e facts for the eternal 
consciousness. They are not real for tis because we are not 
~ 
conscious of them, i. e· ~ we have not constituted their identi.ty; 
this is to .s-ay that the eternal consc·iousness has not realized 
itself or reproduced itself in us. 
Green gave an illustration designed to r.efute the pesttilon 
~ . 
that held perception to be reducible to sensations, that per-
ception was a function of sensations. Imagine an. ocean front. 
There are cliffs, rocks and waves. A stranger is led to this 
location . 
Condition a holds. Condition a is heavy fog. 
Visibility-is hampered but there is not 
complete obscuration. The stranger cannot 
recognize anything. He cannot tell what is 
what. 
(t:2 )· 11.:00 a.m. - Condition a does not hold. It is clear and 
sunny. The stranger now cleB.rly sees the 
cliffs and rocks. 
Condition a again holds. Fog.density is 
-same as at t. But now the stranger can 
out the clif}. The fog is heavy, but he 
make out the outline of what was clearly 
visible only three hours earlier. 
. 
the 
make 
can 
The sensations at t 1 and t 3 were identical. Yet at t 2 the cliffs 
were not seen while at t 3 they were. The conclusion is clear 
-- sensations do not suffice to explain perception. 
151 · Prolegomena, p. 54. 
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One might ask: "What about our sensatio~s of color, say 
red?" For Green, however, what has been described is a 
perception,_ not a sensation. · Red is a universal-. -To say I 
nave a red sensation is proof that I am already thinking ~he 
feeling. When we look at the back covers of two identical 
books, we say the color is the same, red. But surely the 
' 
feelings did not combine themselves and present themselves as. 
one, and then announce their identity of color to us? Feeling 
or ~eeling consciousness does not compare itself with anything; 
sensations do not compare themselves as identical or ·different 
from anything else. Only mind (a self-distinguishing subject) 
can account· for this. Green saw no other alternative. 
The most crucial problem Green faced in explaining the 
status af sensations was the question of the material element 
of sensations. Kant, whom Green followed closely, distinguished 
between the form and content of knowledge. The understanding 
(Green's self-distinguishing subject) supplied the form. The 
material, what Kant called natura materialiter spectata, was 
there to be formed. The material element aid not depend on the 
understanding except insofar as it became incorporated into 
knowledge·. Matter had to conform to the pure concepts· of· the 
understanding {Green's universal relations). Green, however, 
criticized precisely this aspect of the master's program, viz,!:, 
· ~- the material element, the thing-in-.i ts elf. Green could not 
accept this f'orm-matter distinction. It implied, something 
''-
which he explicitly rejected, namely that noumenal .reality 
66 
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~xisted outside of consciousness. 
\. 
.-~;;:. .. For Green, this meant it 
existed outside of reality -- ·an· absurdity, a contradi·ction. 
Furthermore, Green thought the very notion of the thing-in-
itself was inconsistent with Kant's own doctrine. If we say the 
material element of sensations · is the ef-fect of things~in-them~ 
selves, we are asserting a relation between the noumena and 
phenomena. But this assertion extends beyond the valid limits 
of Kant's categories . 
... but we cannot assert such a relation of 
cause and effect between the things and the sensation without making the former· a member of a relation which, as Kant himself on 
occasion would be ready to remind us, we have no warrant for extending beyond the world of experience, or for considering as independent of the intellectual principle of unity which is.the condition of there being such a world.152 
·Causation has no meaning ~.xcept in the phenomenal world. 
But if this is so-; from whence comes the material element 
of pe·rception·J It strains the imagination to suggest that 
thought g~nerates the material. Are not sensations forced 
upon us whenever _we open our eyes? It does not seem possible 
· to "reduce the world of experience to a web· of relations in 
which nothing is related, as it would be if everything were 
. erased from it which we cannot refer to the action of a 
combining int_elligence. rrl53 It . seems as if dualism is forced 
upon us. Is there something (sensations) which is .. not depe.ndent 
l 52 Ibid . , p . 4 7 • 
l53Ibid., p. 48. 
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· on con·sciou·sness but which is an i??,dispensible part of our 
intelligent experience? 
Green stated the problem clearly, but he thought there 
was som·ething suspect in its very formulation. The very 
question assumed that it made sense to distinguish the form 
and matter of perception. Once this assumption is granted, 
dualism is forced upon ·us. But is it valid? Green thought 
not. He called the form-matter distinction an "illegitimate_ 
abstraction." It is illegitimate because it is not derived 
from our experience of the world nor is it a necessary 
condition of the possibility of experience. We feel ours el veis_: 
if we imagine 
... that all the distinctions and relations, 
which we present to ourselves -- and neces-
sarily present to ourselves -- in the process 
of learning to know, have counterparts in 
the real world ... the distinctions presented 
may exist only for us ... not in the world as 
it is in itself or for a perfect intelligence .154 
In our experience of sensible events, do we ever run into 
. 
"pure matter", i.e., mere-sensations, unrelated :feelings? 
. ,, 
This was one of the;r dreams of the Lockean tradition. Hume 
said that we experience (receive) "simple impressions"; Locke 
'. ; . 
spolte of "simple ideas". But have we ever experienced a 
'ml,' 
totally unrelated, unqualified sensation? I never have. What 
would a simple impression be like? Would a red patch be a 
154~b· d 
' J. l • ' p. 49. 
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simple impression? Can a red patch be "spaceless" -- without 
.. 
spacial~dimensions? Green would have said that red is a 
uriiversal and thus a red patch is complex, -not simple as we 
... 
naively_ supposed. A red patch takes the form_f(-a). A mere --
-sensation must have t·he form J.!l. Green saw no aspect of our 
. ; .. 
·experience that took such,. a fo~. " ... when we look at what the 
given perception or piece of knowledge is in itself, we find 
- . 155 that it is already formed .•.. " 
One might, correctly I believe, reply that Green was using 
an invalid argument, the ego-centric predicament. Just because 
we have not (and cannot) experience unformed matter, it does 
not follow that matter is always formed and never unformed. 
Let us suppose that I have not and cannot experience angels. 
It does not follow that there are no angels. It is invalid to 
infer that English is the only intelligible language because 
the only people I understand speak English. The logical structure 
of Green's argument made falsification impossible, for even if 
• 
there was pure matter or mere feeling, it would be impossible to 
observe it. His use of this argument is hidden by his equi-
vocation of the word 'experience.' He distinguished two meanings 
* of this word. 
' . 
Yet was not his question "Do we ever experience2 
pure-matter (experience1 )? Of course not. Experience1 and 
experience2 are different (radically different, as Green has 
l55Ibid . 
*er. p. _64. 
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argued) kinds of experience. In othe.r words, Green's position 
~-
is that we can only experience2 those objec~s that fall within 
-
experience2 . But this does not establish that there is no. 
-
such thing as pure (unformed) matter. Not even Kant would have 
-
said ·that we experienced2 ·,·unformed matter in experience2 • 
.. 
Green's epistemology established the position that intelligent 
experience must· take a complex form .. From this he inferred 
that the world too had t·o take on this form. That inference· 
is disputable. 
Since we do not experience unrelated matter, Green pro-
.. nounced it to be an empty phrase and an illegitimate distinction. 
·
11 
••• a sensation apart from thoBght ... would be an unrelated. 
sensation; and an unrelated sensation cannot amount to a fact. 
,. 
70 
Mere sensat'ion is in truth a phrase that represents no reality. 11156 
If Green was correct, if matter cannot be except as related 
t·o ·consciousness, how did he explain the material element? How 
did he explain the arbitrariness of sensations, the fact that 
they force themselves upon uS whethe; we will them or not!157 
l56Ibid., p. 51. 
l57works, II, "Lec~tures On Logic," p.186. " ... sensation is that 
which we cannot retain, and of which we cannot by thinking 
command the recurrence, while the thought relations are in a 
\ 
sense our own. What the uhinking subject has contributed to ~· 
reality, it retains from reality: in th~s sense the conception: , 
of the flower is my own making, while the sensation \vhich must 
supervene upon this conception in order to constitute a real 
flower is an event which I cannot command, and which, having 
occurred, becomes part of a past which I cannot reproduce. 
Adopting the distinction between conception and sensation, 
as one between what I ean mak~ and what I.cannot, we must 
say that, though what·r can make does not amount to the real 
flower, no more does what I cannot make.", 
,.-
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, . . ~_; .r . . ... 
<l 
How can· there be feeling without thought, as there is with 
the man in a fit of absvaction? : 
Green admitted that we do not generate sensations as we 
may be said to generate thoughts in our imagination. It 
"certainly does not de·pend on -ourselves ... whether sensations 
.,.--
shall occur to us in this or that order of succession, with 
this or that degree of intensity. nl5S His point was that in · 
order for sensations to be successive or of a certain degree 
l' of intensity, there must be a subject self-distinguished from 
the sensation in order to render these relations possible. 
What can be said about the man in a fit of abstraction and 
animals? Certainly they feel; yet they are not thinking 
(constituting). Green did not deny that "in a great part of 
6 
our lives we feel without thinking and without any qualification. 
of our feelings by our thoughts ...• nl59 He admitted such a 
notion as a "feeling consciousness,u but insofar as someone or 
an animal feels without thinking, this fact is not a fact for 
him. " ... so far as they feel without thinking, their feelings 
t f t f th f th . . . 11160 are no ac s or em -- or eir consciousness. 
-We have an interesting situation here. On the one hand . . 
he insisted that there were no feelings in the absence of 
thought. Unrelated matter is an illegitimate abstraction . 
. ']. _ . Subject and object are ~strictly correlative. On the other 
l58Prolegomena, p. 52. 
l59Ibid., p. 54. 
160Ibid., p. 53. 
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'I hand, he admitted that we can feel without thinking, in the 
absence of thought. Merely feeling consciousness is. allowed, 
•·I'-' I 
yet it is contradictory to suppose a world "to exist other-· 
i th . d f · .. ul61 w se an in an or consciousness. 
This apparent contradiction was, resolved by the eternal 
consciousness. There is no fact without thought but thought 
is more than just human (our) thought. Our thought is also 
.,~ 
a mode of the eternal consciousness. Man may just. feel. How-
ever this mere feeling is not a fact for him, although it is 
a fact for the eternal consciousness. Green did not argue 
that our thought was a necessary element in the.real; rather, 
thought is necessary. There is a "world-consciousness.of 
which ours is a limited mode. 11162 
Green's final answer to the question of the material 
;, . 
element of sensation was that the very question is mis-conceived. 
Matter apart from all thought is contradictory. l 
(ii) The Constitution of Objects in Perception. Imagine 
a plurality of objects seen at once. This plurality exists 
j 
for consciousness, according to Green's analysis, only in 
virtue of a twofold intellectual act {this twofold act corre-
sponds to our distinction between c1 and c2 ). We have the 
data, the visual sensations.. On these supervene "successive 
161Ibid., p. 56. 
··~ ~ l 
~ 
162rbid., p. 58. 
• - • 
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acts of attention -in which what by anticipation are called the 
parts of the luminous area are traversed .•.• 11163 Upon these 
a~ts of attention (c1 ) ~there s~pervenes _ 
..• a synthesis by which the elements, 
successively detached in the acts of 
attention,---~"~are held together in negation 
of the succession as coexisting parts of 
a whole. These elements are not elements 
of the original sensation .... 164 (italics mine) 
i . 
In other words, when we see a plurality of objects at once, we 
must be affected. (But affectation does not imply recognition). 
The mind must work. There must be successive acts of attention. 
73 
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The mind attends to.its sensations. To use a metaphor, the 
mind moves temporally with the sensations. This is the work 
of c1 . Further mind-activity (c2 ) is needed, only this activity 
is non-temporal. It is a synthesis of the elements "successively 
detached in the acts of attention .•..• " These elements are 
nheld together in negation of the succession as c·oexisting parts 
of a whole." This act is no·t successive but simple or unitary. 
This is the thought-activity which runs through and holds the 
plurality together as a particular whole. The elements that 
enter into the synthesis, the elements that are held together, 
are not the original sensations. They are mental acts of 
recognition~or sensations attended .to. The original sensations 
.. ~ 
-
;· 
163works,· I, "Spencer on the Independence of Matter," p. 415. 
164Ibid. 
. ' .. , _. ' 
... 
" 
were temporal events "which must h~ve been constantly replaced 
by oth~rs as the eye moves duril}_g the process of attentio~ 
,.165 Acts of recognition, however, are not replaced. They • • • • 
remain to be synthesized. What we perceive are the 'products' 
of this two·fold act which turned its attention onto sensations. 
These products are obj~cts ~ Thus perception "neither is nor 
contains sensations. 11166 Sensations are brought into relation 
by intelligence thus becoming sensible objects, but sensible 
objects are not sensations, nor are they reducible to them. 
Thought constitutes objects and "neither its objects·nor the 
•· 
relations by which its object is determined are present as 
· 167 feelings. 
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Sensations afect us but they are not elements of perception. 
Perception does not consist in, nor is it, sensation. Sensa-
tions are interpreted (thought) in the process of perception, 
9 
but this interpretation is not itself a sensation. '' . . •. there 
i~ no perception without an intellectual interpretation of 
t . nl68 sensa ion. It was interpretation that distinguished 
feeling from perception. Green's use of 'interpretation' was 
not that of Kant. For Kant, man made nature, i.e. phenomena, 
but out of _something he did not make. For Green, man "dis-
covered" nature, not by individually making phenomena but by 
l 65Ibid. 
166Ibid., p. 416, 
167works, 
168Ib·_· d ]. . , 
II, "Lectures On Logic," p. 171. 
p. 176. 
• 
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participating or.duplicating the eternal consciousness. There 
was only one world of true relations, the unalterable relations. 
All~ appearances had genuine reality, but only some were related -
··· as --they seeme·d to be. Participating in the eternal conscious·-
ness entailed the Kantian notion of synthesizing·data, but 
synthesizing data did not entail full participation in the 
eternal consciousness. In short, it did not entail truth. 
True perceptual judgments were possible for Green. Later 
idealists, notably Green's student F.H. Bradley, disagreed. 
Bradley thought that perceptual judgments distorted reality. 
In judging that somethin,g is, he claimed one must judge what 
. it is, and this changed the that. By interpreting the sensation 
we get an object, but the object is not identical to the 
sensations interpreted. We have changed something by adding 
thought. Green, however, would not admit that we had anything 
which could be changed before the interpretation. For~Green, 
there was no reality outside of consciousness. A conceptual 
' element was necessary for reality and perception. There was 
no 'this' or 'that' apart from thought. " ... conception, as 
-consciousn~ss of relations, is necessary to that simplest 
individualization of feeling without which there is no 'this' 
· or ' that ! . "169 · 
-.; 
·~ ,,:,· -
169rb1· d.-, 172 p. . 
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